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Abstract
We use unique survey data to study whether the introduction of local elections in China
made local leaders more accountable towards local constituents. We develop a simple model
to predict the eﬀects on diﬀerent policies of increasing local leader accountability, taking into
account that there is an autocratic upper government. We exploit variation in the timing of the
top-down introduction of elections across villages to estimate the causal eﬀects of elections and
ﬁnd that elections aﬀected policy outcomes in a way that is consistent with the predicted eﬀects
of increased local leader accountability.
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1 Introduction
Many developing countries have local elections despite having autocratic central regimes.1 For
example, local elections have occurred in Indonesia under Suharto (1968-1998), Brazil during the
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1See Gandhi and Lust-Okar (2009) for a recent literature review on elections in autocratic regimes.
1military dictatorship (1964-1985) and Mexico under the PRI (1929-2000). Recently, local elections
were also introduced in Vietnam in 1998, in Yemen in 2001 and in Saudi Arabia in 2005. China,
which introduced elections at the village level starting in the 1980s, is a primary example. Despite
the fact that these institutional arrangements aﬀect the lives of millions of people worldwide, we
have little evidence on whether or how they matter. The cross-country empirical literature typically
focuses on comparisons of clusters of institutions at the national level.2 The few within-country em-
pirical studies on local democratic institutions are typically set in the context of democratic regimes
and study particular aspects of local elections rather than the eﬀect of the introduction of elec-
tions.3 Theoretical predictions of the eﬀect of introducing local democracy within an authoritarian
regime are ambiguous. On the one hand, providing citizens with the capacity to hold local leaders
accountable should improve leader performance.4 On the other hand, autocratic regimes may not
have the incentives to implement proper electoral procedures, which could weaken accountability.
Moreover, even if elections are procedurally sound, the elected leaders might not have the de facto
power to carry out the will of their constituents. For instance, Acemoglu and Robinson (2008)
argues that institutional reforms can fail to result in signiﬁcant policy changes because they are
easily circumvented by the existing elites. This is a particularly pressing concern when reforms only
aﬀect the lowest level of an otherwise autocratic regime.
In this paper, we examine the eﬀects of introducing local elections in an authoritarian regime in
the context of village electoral reforms in rural China (1980-2005). During the 1980s, the regime be-
gan to introduce elections for members of the village committee in rural areas. The most important
position among these was the village chief (VC). Previously, this position was directly appointed by
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) oﬃcials. The regime believed that elections would provide the
VC with a democratic mandate, and thereby more legitimacy to implement and enforce central gov-
ernment directives in the village. In addition, many proponents of this reform argued that villagers
would use elections to monitor and discipline village oﬃcials, who were in many cases suspected of
corruption and shirking. However, opponents retorted that shifting accountability towards villagers
would worsen the implementation of unpopular policies, such as the One Child Policy, and generally
weaken the center’s control. Therefore, to ensure that elected leaders would still be partially ac-
countable to the CCP, the party leadership structure within villages and at all levels of government
above the village remained in place. Moreover, upper levels maintained control over the process of
rural democratization and increased the openness of local elections gradually. In the ﬁrst electoral
reform, the local CCP could nominate the candidates in the elections. This was later followed by the
introduction of open nominations to the villagers. Since elections were often poorly implemented
2See for instance Mauro (1995), Barro (1996), Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu et al. (2001), Persson and Tabellini
(2004), Mulligan et al. (2004) and Mobarak (2005).
3Several recent works study the eﬀects of speciﬁc aspects of local democratic governance in India (e.g., Pande,
2003; and Chattopadhyay and Duﬂo, 2004) and Brazil (e.g., Ferraz and Finan, 2008). Amongst these studies, Foster
and Rosenzweig (2004) is the one exception in studying the eﬀects of the introduction of local elections in India. More
generally, Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006) provides a review of decentralization reforms in developing countries.
4This is what the political accountability literature would predict. See the textbook by Besley (2006) for a review
of the theory.
2and the reforms did not aﬀect the role of the CCP in any other parts of the regime, these reforms
can only be interpreted as a movement towards limited democracy.
The main goal of this study is to determine whether these electoral reforms caused the VC to
become more accountable to his village constituents. Our study makes three contributions. First,
we develop a model to predict the eﬀect of increasing local leader accountability on diﬀerent policies.
Second, we construct a large panel data set that documents electoral policies, village political and
economic structures, and policy and economic outcomes that spans over two decades. Finally, we
test the predictions or model by estimating the causal eﬀect of the introduction of elections. The
empirical results, together with the predictions from our simple theoretical framework, allow us to
understand the eﬀect of elections on local leader accountability. The richness of our data allows us
to explore and rule out the most likely alternative explanations for our empirical results.
Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst step towards this goal is to determine how local policies change as a result
of a hypothesized change in accountability in a context where the central government remains auto-
cratic. We develop a simple model of village policy-making with three actors: the upper government,
the VC and the villagers. In the model, the introduction of electoral reforms changes the VC’s posi-
tion from being solely accountable to the upper government to being accountable to both the upper
government and the villagers. In our study, this partial shift in accountability is synonymous to an
increase in accountability towards villagers. We show that this shift in accountability has diﬀerent
eﬀects on policy outcomes depending on the amount of discretion the village government has over
the policy and the congruence of preferences between the upper government and the villagers.
This provides us with a useful typology of policies that guides our empirical analysis and inference
of changes in accountability. Type I policies are under the discretion of the VC and for which the
upper government and villagers have conﬂicting preferences over them. For these policies, a partial
shift in accountability in favor of villagers will obviously cause the VC to implement policies that
are closer to the villagers’ preferences. Type II policies are also under the discretion of the VC, but
for which there is no obvious conﬂict of interest between villagers and upper levels of government.
The eﬀects of increasing accountability towards villagers on these policies are less obvious because
there is no disagreement between villagers and the upper government. Our model shows that an
increase in accountability will cause Type II policies to move towards the preferences of villagers
only if the VC suﬀers a cost of implementation (e.g., cost of eﬀort or lost rents) and the villagers are
better than the upper government at monitoring the VC. Type III policies are beyond the discretion
of the VC. A shift in accountability should have no eﬀect on such policies.
Finding that the introduction of elections causes Type I policies to change in favor of villagers
implies that the reforms eﬀectively shifted accountability. Finding a similar eﬀect on Type II policies
is a sign that the villagers are better monitors of VCs than upper levels of government. Type III
policies serve as placebo tests. If the introduction of elections only aﬀects VC accountability and
is not correlated with other policy changes, then we expect to ﬁnd that elections have no eﬀect on
Type III policies.
One of the key advantages of the Chinese context is that there is a rich set of policies for which
3the discretion of the VC, the amount of eﬀort from the VC that is required for implementation, and
the preferences of the upper government and villagers are well-understood. Therefore, we can map
the theoretical typology into observable policy outcomes. Type I policies include the One Child
Policy and upper-government expropriation of land, both of which are extremely unpopular with
villagers and can be partially inﬂuenced by the VC. Type II policies include within-village public
goods provision and within-village land allocation. Both are costly to the VC in terms of eﬀort and
there is no major conﬂict of interest between villagers and upper governments. Type III policies
include the location of secondary schools and the provision of central government special aid for
households below the national poverty line. The village government takes no part in the decisions
on either of these policies. We discuss these policies and how they ﬁt the typology in detail in the
paper.
Lack of data has posed a serious barrier for studies of Chinese electoral reforms. Recently,
researchers such as Scott Rozelle have begun to compile large cross sections of detailed data on
village economic and political variables.5 However, to fully capture the eﬀects of the introduction
of elections, we need a large panel of villages. Moreover, we need systematic data on the political
power structure within villages and the policy outcomes that we describe above. One important
contribution of this study is to provide such data. We document the history of political reforms,
policies, public investments and the powers of village leaders by conducting a large retrospective
survey of over two hundred villages that covers the years 1980-2005. We match this survey to
annual economic data collected by the Ministry of Agriculture during 1987-2005, forming a unique
village-level panel of political, economic and social variables that we use for our empirical analysis.
To the best of our knowledge, these data provide the most comprehensive record of the political
reform history of Chinese villages in terms of geographic and temporal scope.
Using these data, we estimate the causal eﬀect of elections on village-level outcomes by exploiting
diﬀerences in the timing of their introduction across villages. Timing was decided by the upper levels
of government, with little input from villages. To retain control, the upper government is known to
have delayed introducing elections in villages with a history of non-compliance with central policies.
No other pattern has emerged from either our data, the existing literature, or interviews that the
authors of this paper conducted with oﬃcials from various levels of the Chinese government. Since
“problematic” villages are few in number, our main empirical strategy assumes that the timing of
the elections is quasi-random for villages within a province. We later relax this assumption and
check that our estimates are not driven by endogenous timing in the introduction of elections. Our
main strategy is similar in spirit to a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences (DD) strategy where we compare the
outcomes of villages that have had their ﬁrst election to villages in the same province which have
not yet introduced elections: village ﬁxed eﬀects control for all time-invariant diﬀerences between
villages, such as distance to a city; year ﬁxed eﬀects control for all changes over time that aﬀect
regions similarly, such as nationwide policy changes; and province-time trends allow us to control
5Scott Rozelle and a team of researchers from the Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy in Beijing have thus far
produced two detailed studies on elections, ﬁscal reforms and village pubic goods investment from their data. See
Luo et al. (2007, 2010).
4for all diﬀerential changes across provinces which are broadly linear. Controlling for province-time
trends is important given the divergence in economic growth across China during this period.
Our empirical analysis begins by documenting that VCs had de facto power to make policy
decisions. Then we examine the impact of elections on policy outcomes. First, we ﬁnd that the
introduction of elections reduced the incidence of upper-government expropriation of village land and
the enforcement of the One Child Policy. Hence, elections shift Type I policies in favor of villagers,
which imply that elections increased the VC’s accountability towards villagers. Second, we ﬁnd
that elections increased household land allocation and improved village public goods investment.
In particular, elections increased public investment in schooling for villages with many school-
age children and increased public investment in irrigation for villages that are heavily dependent
on agriculture. Therefore, elections also shift Type II policies towards the preferences of villagers.
Under our framework, this implies that villagers are better than the upper government at monitoring
the VC. Finally, we ﬁnd that elections had no eﬀect on upper-government special aid or the distance
to secondary schools, i.e., Type III policies. These results provide strong evidence that our results
reﬂect a change in the VC’s accountability rather than confounding factors, such as simultaneous
policy changes at higher levels of government. Consistent with this, we ﬁnd that the increase in
public investment is entirely driven by funding raised from villagers; elections had no eﬀect on public
goods funding from upper-government sources.
It is worth noting that our results reﬂect the introduction of the ﬁrst election and that we ﬁnd no
evidence of additional eﬀects from the subsequent introduction of open nominations. This suggests
that the main mechanism behind our results is more likely to be the change in the incentives for
VCs rather than the villagers’ ability to select their favored candidates.6
The causal interpretation of our estimates requires the assumption that the timing of the intro-
duction of elections was not correlated with other factors which may have inﬂuenced the outcomes
of interest. It seems unlikely that other factors can generate the same eﬀects as a shift in leader ac-
countability for the large set of outcomes that we examine but leave our placebo policies unchanged.
However, to be cautious, we present a detailed discussion of potential caveats and address them in
the section on robustness.
The results of this study are important for policy makers and researchers in development eco-
nomics and political economy. They show that a limited movement towards democracy can generate
signiﬁcant improvements for the population, even if the overall authoritarian structure of the regime
does not change. Moreover, our results provide support for policies that aim to improve local gov-
ernance in developing countries by harnessing the ability of citizens to monitor local oﬃcials.
This paper contributes to a number of diﬀerent literatures. First, we add valuable within-country
evidence to the cross-country literature on the relationship between political institutions and policy
outcomes. Second, we contribute to the growing body of work on the role of local governance
in developing countries. In particular, we build on the increasing number of empirical studies on
6This interpretation is subject to the caveat that it assumes that the CCP was not always selecting candidates
that were the most preferred by the villagers. See the discussion in section 3.
5re-election incentives (e.g., Besley and Case, 1995; DalBó and Rossi, 2008; de Janvry et al., 2010;
Ferraz and Finan, 2011) and on the eﬀect of information on electoral accountability (e.g., Besley
and Burgess, 2002; Ferraz and Finan, 2008; Bobonis et al., 2010; and Banerjee et al., 2010).7 Our
work is also closely related to Björkman and Svensson (2009), which studies the eﬀect of citizen
monitoring on local-government public goods provision, and Foster and Rosenzweig (2004), which
ﬁnds that the introduction of the panchayat system in India improved the provision of public goods.
Our ﬁnding that elections improve public goods provision in China is consistent with these previous
studies. Also, the implication that villagers are better than upper levels of government at monitoring
village leaders is similar to the ﬁndings of Björkman and Svensson (2009). However, the nature of
China’s strong autocratic state and the mechanisms driving our results are very diﬀerent from these
earlier works.8 To the best of our knowledge, the only existing empirical studies of democratic
local governance within authoritarian regimes examine China’s village elections. These studies use
cross-sectional data or relatively small samples of village panels and ﬁnd that elections can reduce
inequality and increase the overall level of public goods provision (e.g., Gan et al., 2007; Luo et al.,
2007, 2010; Shen and Yao, 2008; Zhang et al., 2004).9 We diﬀer from these earlier works in our
focus on inferring the eﬀect of local elections on leader accountability within an autocratic regime.
We contribute to existing works on Chinese elections by providing a coherent framework that has
predictions on a broad set of outcomes, which we can test using data that are richer and cover more
years and regions than the existing datasets used in previous works.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the background of Chinese villages and
the electoral reforms. Section 3 presents the conceptual framework. Section 4 describes the main
empirical strategy and Section 5 describes the data. Section 6 presents our main empirical ﬁndings
and Section 7 examines the robustness checks. Section 8 oﬀers concluding remarks.
7Bobonis et al. (2010) and Ferraz and Finan (2008) ﬁnd that the information released by audits aﬀects electoral
governance and performance. (For a study of the eﬀect of upper-government audits versus citizen monitoring, also
see Olken (2007)). Besley and Case (1995), Ferraz and Finan (2011) and de Janvry et al. (2010) compare elected
oﬃcials who face term limits with those who do not, DalBó and Rossi (2008) study the eﬀect of term length on eﬀort
in Argentina. Our ﬁndings also provide valuable empirical evidence for understanding the diﬀerences in incentives
and performance between appointed and elected oﬃcials. This literature has mostly been theoretical – e.g., Besley
and Coate (2003), Maskin and Tirole (2004) and Alesina and Tabellini (2007, 2008)
8In terms of mechanisms, we are examining the eﬀect of a set of mechanisms embodied in the formal institution
of elections. In contrast, Björkman and Svensson (2009) focuses on citizen monitoring, which is only one of the many
mechanisms included in elections. Foster and Rosenzweig (2004) focus on party competition, which is unlikely to
play a role in China’s one-party context.
9There are a number of other related studies on Chinese elections (e.g., Rozelle and Boisvert, 1994, 1995; Oi and
Rozelle, 2000; Kennedy et al., 2004; Brandt and Turner, 2007; Mu and Zhang, 2011). Amongst studies of rural
China, our examination of land expropriation and allocation is also closely related to two recent articles on land
tenure in rural China (Rozelle and Li, 1998; Jacoby et al., 2001). In a related context Martinez-Bravo (2010) studies
the implications of diﬀerent local governance structures in Indonesia under Suharto in the persistence of patronage
networks and voter manipulation in the ﬁrst democratic election.
62 Background
2.1 The Village Government
Villages are the lowest level of administration in rural China. Village governments were ﬁrst or-
ganized by the communist government during the early 1950s, with two groups of leaders in each
village. The VC, also referred to as the village “chief,” “head” or “chairman,” leads a village commit-
tee that typically comprises three to ﬁve members. The second group of leaders are the CCP village
branch. They are led by the village party secretary (henceforth PS). Before elections were intro-
duced, all these positions were ﬁlled by appointment by the county government and village party
branch.10 On average, there are approximately 400 households per village. The village government
is extremely important for the well-being of its citizens because it implements policies mandated by
the central-government within the village and takes many important village level decisions, such as
public goods provision and land allocation (e.g., Oi and Rozelle, 2000; Rozelle and Boisvert, 1994,
Brandt and Turner, 2007; Whiting, 1996).
2.2 Electoral Reforms
The ﬁrst local elections were introduced in the early 1980s soon after the fall of the commune
system. The primary motive for introducing local elections was to improve the enforcement of
centrally mandated policies at the village level. Proponents of reform claimed that elected village
leaders would have more legitimacy and would better distribute the burden of these policies, which
would increase overall compliance. It was also hoped that local leaders with a democratic mandate
would better determine which public good investments were necessary and would better facilitate
the local coordination necessary for providing them (e.g., O’Brien, 1994; Kelliher, 1997; O’Brien
and Li, 1999).
In addition, advocates of reform argued that village elections would reduce the need for the
central government to closely monitor local oﬃcials, which was diﬃcult in a geographically vast and
heterogeneous country. This concern has been endemic in the centrally planned regime since its con-
ception in 1949, and had been exacerbated by the widening regional diﬀerences caused by post-Mao
market reforms. Imperfect monitoring meant that many local cadres were suspected of corruption
and shirking, which generated intense discontent and discredited the regime in rural China. The
hierarchical structure not only observed the actions of local leaders imperfectly, but also faced the
diﬃculty of knowing the preferences and needs of each locality.11 The introduction of local elections
10The Chinese government, led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), is broadly ordered in a vertical hierarchy,
from the central government in Beijing down to the rural levels that comprise counties and townships. According to
the National Statistical Yearbooks, rural population decreased from approximately 83% of total population in 1980 to
approximately 75% by 2000. Today, there are 31 provincial units (which include autonomous regions and city-level
municipalities), governing 2,872 counties, which contain 14,677 townships and 623,669 rural villages (as deﬁned by
the number of village governments, cunming weiyuanhui). This means that the average county government supervises
approximately 5 townships and 217 villages.
11See Meng et al. (2010) for a study of the role that information problems can play in a centrally planned regime
in the context of China’s Great Famine.
7was seen as a potential solution to this problem because it shifted the monitoring responsibilities
onto villagers. Proponents argued that making local leaders accountable to villagers would impose
checks on the VC’s behavior and would also allow villagers to select the most competent candidates
(Kelliher, 1997). The latter may have been particularly relevant to the Chinese context since village
leaders almost invariably came from within the same village.
“Who supervises rural cadres? Can we supervise them? No, not even if we had 48
hours a day....” – Peng Zhen, vice-chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, said at
the chairmanship meeting of the Standing Committee of the Sixth NPC, April 6, 1987
(O’Brien and Li, 1999).
Opponents, however, retorted that shifting accountability towards villagers would disrupt the im-
plementation of unpopular policies, such as the One Child Policy, and generally weaken hierarchical
control in an increasingly heterogeneous country. In particular, regional governments voiced con-
cerns about the eﬀect of elections in two types of “problematic” villages: those that were already
resisting unpopular policies and those that were dominated by a large kinship clan.12
These potential costs were taken into account when designing the electoral reforms. The main
thrust of the reform was to allow the VC and the village committee to be elected by the villagers
instead of appointed by the regional CCP. VCs were to be elected for three-year terms with no
stipulated term limits. However, to ensure that village leaders would still be partially accountable
to the CCP, there was no change in the selection method of the members of the village CCP branch
and PS positions, who continued to be appointed. Moreover, the upper government maintained
tight control of the democratization process and only gradually increased openness. Initially, the
regional CCP nominated the candidates but was required by law to nominate at least two of them
per position. Only in a second wave of reforms were nominations opened to all villagers. This is
commonly referred to as haixuan.
Elections were introduced in a top-down fashion by the provincial and county governments.
Once the provincial government decided to implement village elections, almost all villages within
that province followed within a few years (O’Brien and Li, 1999). By all accounts, villages had little
discretion over the timing of introduction of elections, which is characteristic of reforms in rural
China.
“These [elections] should not be interpreted as bottom-up initiatives by the villagers
themselves; they are not in a position to play any precedent-setting part in the initi-
ation of new electoral reforms. There is a mistaken belief among some people outside
China regarding this... elections are quietly being instituted at levels above the village,
engineered ﬁrst in selected districts at a distance from Beijing, through the connivance
of the [central] Ministry of Civil Aﬀairs and middle-ranking oﬃcials out in the regions.”
12In the latter case, the concern was that the elected position would be captured by the dominant clan, which
would then implement policies for the beneﬁt of its clan members at the cost of other villagers (O’Brien and Li, 2006:
Ch. 3).
8— Unger (2002, p. 222).13
Several innovative provincial governments began to experiment with elections in the early 1980s.
After some debate within the CCP, village elections were formally codiﬁed by the central government
in the Organizational Law on Village Committees (henceforth OLVC) in 1987. From this point
onwards, all provinces were pushed to introduce elections for all rural areas. Finally, a revision of
the OLVC in 1998 made elections of VCs mandatory and required candidate nominations to be
open to all villagers.
The top-down process of introducing elections means that diﬀerences in timing across villages are
largely driven by the upper governments’ preferences of where to ﬁrst introduce elections. According
to anecdotal and qualitative evidence, the main determinant seems to have been the desire to delay
elections in the “problematic” villages that we discussed earlier (e.g., Oi and Rozelle, 2000; Li, 2009).
There are several additional facts to keep in mind for the empirical analysis. First, the relative
powers of the VC and the PS were never clariﬁed.14 For this reason, one of the contributions of our
survey is to document the de facto power of each leader. Second, in these elections, there are no
political parties and no slates of candidates with common platforms. Candidates are typically well-
known by the villagers as they are from the same village. As a consequence, candidates typically
run on well-understood issues and are probably selected for qualities that are observable on a daily
basis.15 Finally, it is important to note that the electoral procedures varied greatly in quality and
in many cases were seriously subverted. For instance, some of the ﬁrst elections only had as many
candidates as the number of positions to be ﬁlled and were therefore non-competitive, i.e., the CCP
appointed only one candidate per position. Our survey documents these aberrations in election
quality, which allows us to examine and control for them in the empirical analysis.16 The next
section discusses the implications of these non-competitive elections for the interpretation of our
results.
3 Conceptual Framework
The main goal of this paper is to understand whether the introduction of local elections in China
was eﬀective in making VCs more accountable to villagers. This is far from obvious considering
their imperfect implementation and the continued supervisory role of the CCP. Moreover, the village
government has responsibilities over a range of policies, and it is unclear ex-ante how an increase
in the accountability of the village government towards the villagers aﬀects each policy outcome.
13Unger (2002) notes the general passivity of villages in implementing rural reforms in his study of land reforms
and the adoption of the Household Responsibility Reform during the mid 1980s.
14In fact the second OLVC stated that village decisions were to be taken by the VC and village committee under the
“guidance”of the CCP Branch. This vagueness led to disputes and encroachment by the PS and county government
on the independence of the VC (e.g., Oi and Rozelle, 2000; Guo and Bernstein, 2004).
15There are very few accounts of actual electoral campaigning. In many cases, elections were set up with only a
few days’ notice (Unger, 2002: p. 221).
16There were also other aberrations in electoral procedures. We document and control for these in our analysis
later in the paper. See section 5.
9To shed light on this issue, we develop a simple model of political accountability in the context of
an overall authoritarian regime and illustrate the eﬀects of an increase in accountability towards
villagers on diﬀerent types of policies. Then, we discuss the policy outcomes that we can observe
in the data and how they map into our conceptual framework. Finally, we discuss the potential
mechanisms underlying the change in accountability and the extent to which our analysis will be
able to distinguish their role in driving our main results.
3.1 The Eﬀect of a Partial Shift in Accountability
We develop a simple model of political accountability in the context of an overall authoritarian
regime and illustrate the eﬀects of an increase in accountability towards villagers on diﬀerent types
of policies. This model is presented formally in the Appendix. In this section, we provide an
intuitive discussion.
We adapt a standard accountability model to the rural Chinese context, where there are three
actors: the upper government, the village government (which we simply think of as the village chief –
VC) and the villagers. Within this model, we examine the eﬀect of a shift in the accountability of the
VC. Before elections, he is solely accountable to the upper government. Afterwards, he is accountable
to both the upper government and the villagers. In our context, increasing accountability towards
the villagers is equivalent to a shift in accountability away from the upper government towards the
villagers. Our model distinguishes between three types of policies according to whether the VC has
any discretion in enforcement, the preferences of the upper government and villagers over the policy
outcomes, and the amount of disutility incurred by the VC in the implementation of the policy. We
categorize policies into three types.
The ﬁrst type (Type I) comprises policies that the VC can inﬂuence and for which villagers and
the upper government have opposing preferences. The model predicts that a shift in accountability
moves these types of policies towards the preferences of villagers. This provides a simple test for a
shift in accountability.
For the second type of policies (Type II), villagers and upper government oﬃcials share similar
preferences, the VC has discretion over the policies and he suﬀers a cost of implementation. If
implementing these policies was costless to the VC, he would cater to the preferences of villagers
and upper government independently of the direction of accountability. However, since the policy
is costly to the VC (in terms of eﬀort or loss of rents), he will try to shirk. In this case, making the
VC accountable to villagers will shift policies towards the preferences of villagers only if villagers
are better than the upper government at monitoring and restraining village oﬃcials. A change in
these policies is therefore a sign of a monitoring advantage on the part of villagers.
The third type of policies (Type III) are those that are beyond the control of the village gov-
ernment. A shift in accountability should have no eﬀect in such cases.
In the empirical analysis, we will test the hypothesis that the introduction of elections increased
the VC’s accountability by investigating whether elections shifted Type I policies towards the pref-
erences of villagers. We test the additional hypothesis that villagers are better at monitoring VCs
10than the upper government by investigating whether elections also shifted Type II policies towards
the preferences of villagers. Type III policies serve as placebos in the empirical analysis. In other
words, we check that the eﬀects of Types I and II policies are driven by a change in the VC’s
accountability rather than other spurious factors by checking that elections do not aﬀect Type III
policies. Note that our interpretation need not assume that village leaders have much discretion over
Types I and II policies or that they have absolutely no discretion over Type III policies. Rather,
we only need to assume that village governments have relatively more discretion over the ﬁrst two
types of policies.
3.2 Observable Policy Outcomes
The policy outcomes we examine are the following:
TYPE I: The One Child Policy (OCP) and village land expropriation by the upper government
are two extremely unpopular with villagers and for which the VC has some discretion in enforcement.
The OCP, which began in 1979-80, restricts families to have only one child and is the central
government’s main instrument for reducing fertility. However, in order to prevent female infanticide
(due to the strong boy preference in rural China), the government also allows exemptions in special
circumstances. One common exemption is to allow households to have a second child if the ﬁrst
is a girl. This is outlined in State Council Document No. 7, which was published by the central
government in 1984. However, since the central government continued to pressure regional leaders
to minimize fertility and did not specify when the exemption should be applied, there is built-in
ambiguity that allows some degree of local discretion. In practice, while these formal exemptions
are granted at upper levels of government, de facto enforcement of the One Child Policy (e.g.,
persuading parents to have abortions of higher parity pregnancies, monitoring illegal births and
administering ﬁnes) is carried out at the village level. Moreover, village leaders are the ones that
lobby the upper government for formal exemptions. Therefore, village leaders can inﬂuence the
enforcement of the One Child Policy by choosing the amount of eﬀort they exert in lobbying upper
governments versus the amount of eﬀort expended in monitoring and persuading village parents to
have fewer children. This room for discretion at the village level is consistent with the observed
variation in the implementation of the One Child Policy (e.g., the conditions for which parents are
allowed multiple children) across villages.17
Upper-government expropriations of village land are typically related to laws of eminent domain
for the construction of infrastructure and the geographic expansion of cities and townships. However,
they are always highly contentious as they result in the permanent loss of farmland to villagers
(Bernstein and Lu, 2003; Cai, 2003; Guo, 2001; O’Brien and Li, 1999).18 As with the One Child
Policy, the village government can attempt to prevent or delay expropriation by lobbying the upper-
17This is true within provinces and even within counties. This variation is present both in our survey data and
in the data on village-level family planning policies reported by the China Health and Nutritional Surveys. These
statistics are available upon request.
18By law, villagers are ﬁnancially compensated for the expropriated land. However, compensation is often inade-
quate in practice.
11level government. It can also organize villagers to peacefully resist.19
TYPE II: The provision of village-level public goods, such as primary schools and irrigation,
and within-village land allocation are policies for which the upper government does not have strong
preferences over. However, the upper government values political stability and hence wants this
policies to satisfy villagers’ needs. Therefore, it arguably agrees with the preferences of villagers. In
contrast, providing the optimal level and composition of public goods and allocating land requires
signiﬁcant eﬀort from the village leader and can reduce rent-seeking opportunities. For example,
less accountable VCs may shirk in their responsibilities, underprovide useful public goods and keep
too much land under the direct control of the village.20
Public goods are mostly ﬁnanced with funds from the village, supplemented with a smaller
amount of funds from the upper levels of government. The VC needs to raise the required funds
and determine the correct object for investment.21 The VC has very little discretion over funds
from the upper government, but has signiﬁcant control over within village funding. Therefore, the
latter should be more responsive to a change in the VC’s accountability than funding from the upper
government.
All land is publicly owned in China. Households are granted long term land contracts. The
allocation of such contracts is one of the main responsibilities of village leaders. It is a contentious
issue in rural areas, where the average household farms are approximately ﬁve mu (one mu is
approximately 1/15th of a hectare). A small increase in land can be extremely valuable (Unger,
2002; p.145). There are two types of land reallocations in rural China. The ﬁrst type includes large-
scale reallocations which aﬀect a signiﬁcant proportion of households in the village. The second
type includes smaller-scale reallocations (e.g., marginal adjustments for a few households, typically
due to changes in household size). Our study focuses on the latter because they occur with higher
frequency and because village leaders have more discretion over them as they receive relatively little
attention from upper levels of government. A small fraction of village land is retained under the
direct control of the village government so that the second type of land adjustment can take place
without village-wide disruptions. Land that is directly controlled by the village government can be
used to generate revenues for the village. This is often done by leasing land to rich village farmers or
village enterprises/factories.22 In principle, the proﬁts from these ventures are supposed to beneﬁt
all villagers. However, in practice, corrupt village leaders have been known to extract personal rents
from land controlled by the village governments (Brandt and Turner, 2007; Oi and Rozelle, 2000;
Rozelle and Boisvert, 1994). Therefore, increasing land allocated to households can cause village
leaders additional disutility from the loss of rent-seeking opportunities.
19O’Brien and Li (2006: Ch 3) provides many examples of how village governments coordinate “rightful” resistance
in protest against land expropriation.
20Luo et al. (2007) and Luo et al. (2010) show that, on average, village provision of public goods is very small and
far from adequate. Brandt and Turner (2007) also use land control as a measure of VC rents.
21Villages typically fund most of their own public goods with proﬁts generated by collectively owned property (e.g.,
village enterprises), ad hoc fees and case-by-case levies charged to households. The village government’s ability to
impose ad hoc fees changed towards the end of our study period when the Tax and Fee Reform (2002-03) banned the
practice. We will control for this in our empirical analysis.
22There are many papers describing land use and contracts in rural China. For example, see Rozelle and Li (1998).
12TYPE III: Special aid and the provision of high school education are two policies that are
decided entirely outside of the village. Special aid is a transfer from higher levels of government
to villages that strictly depends on the number of households below the national poverty line. The
provision of secondary education is decided by regional ministries of education. In practice, high
schools in China are always in townships and cities and not located in villages. Note that the
amount of upper-government funding for village public goods can also fall into this category of
policies because the VC is unlikely to have much discretion over it.
3.3 Mechanisms
The objective of this study is to determine whether local elections in rural China eﬀectively increased
the accountability of the VC towards villagers. The political agency literature proposes two main
mechanisms that voters use to hold elected politicians accountable.23 First, elections can help voters
to address moral hazard problems by rewarding good performance with re-election. In this way,
elections serve as means to provide the correct incentives to oﬃce holders. Second, voters can use
elections to select the politicians that are more competent or whose preferences are better aligned
with citizens’ preferences. Recall that an important element of the debate among CCP leaders over
the introduction of elections was about the capacity of elections to both control and select local
oﬃcials.
It is important to note that the incentive eﬀect of elections in rural China might be at play
even if elections were not at ﬁrst competitive (e.g., if the CCP nominates only one candidate per
position). The introduction of elections, no matter how imperfect, signaled that the regime cared
about the preferences of villagers. This encouraged villagers to demand better implementation of
elections. O’Brien and Li (2006) documents numerous cases in which villagers, dissatisﬁed with
the candidate(s) that the CCP nominated, appealed to province and central government oﬃcials,
who investigated these concerns, recalled incumbent VCs and called for new elections.24 Therefore,
even VCs elected under non-competitive elections would have expected to face competition from
other candidates in the next round of elections. Hence, the desire to remain in oﬃce would have
incentivized these VCs.25
The most straightforward way to separate the role of incentives from the role of better leader
selection in changing policy outcomes is to compare the eﬀect of elections in villages where elections
23This literature is large, starting with the seminal contribution of Barro (1973). For textbook treatments, see
Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Besley (2006).
24For example, O’Brien documents a case in which angry crowds of villagers wanted to dismiss their village chief
and protested in the township. In the end, they successfully obtained recalls, new elections were held and new VCs
were elected. In yet another example, villagers complained that their elections had been manipulated with fraudulent
votes and argued that the nominated candidates were corrupt. They requested the right to nominate their own
candidates (this was many years before open nominations was oﬃcially introduced in 1998) but were ignored by their
county government. Then, they appealed to Beijing, where the Ministry of Civil Aﬀairs investigated, forced a recall
and a new election where the villagers nominated their own candidates (O’Brien and Li, 2006: Ch. 3).
25Consistent with the belief that the introduction of elections was important even when they were not competitive,
Landry et al. (2010) ﬁnd that voter turn out is high even when competition is extremely limited.
13entailed a change in VC to villages that retained their previously appointed leader.26 Unfortunately,
we lack systematic information on the VC prior to the introduction of elections. However, we can
use the introduction of open nominations, which occurred after the introduction of elections for most
villages, to shed some light on this question. When the CCP appoints the candidates, villagers can
only select among a very restricted set. In contrast, when nominations are open, the choice set
is maximized. Therefore, we can assess the importance of the selection mechanism by examining
whether opening nominations enhances the eﬀect of elections. Finding that open nominations
increases the eﬀect of elections would suggest that the selection mechanism contributed to the
impact of elections. If no such eﬀect can be found, a natural interpretation is that the selection
mechanism was not important in rural China. Note that this interpretation assumes that the CCP
did not always appoint the villagers’ preferred candidate.27 While we believe that this is the most
likely scenario, we have little concrete evidence regarding the CCP’s selection criteria of nominees.
The results for the eﬀect of introducing open nominations should be interpreted with this caveat.28
4 Empirical Strategy
To estimate the causal eﬀect of elections, we employ a ﬁxed eﬀects strategy where we control for
village and year ﬁxed eﬀects and province-speciﬁc time trends. Village ﬁxed eﬀects control for
all time-invariant diﬀerences between villages, such as geographic characteristics (e.g., hilliness or
distance from a city), at a ﬁner level than province ﬁxed eﬀects. Year ﬁxed eﬀects control for
changes over time that aﬀect all villages similarly (e.g., national policy changes, macroeconomic
growth). Province-speciﬁc time trends control for the fact that provincial governments’ decisions
to introduce elections may have been driven by time-varying characteristics of the province. These
time trends also allow us to control for the widening diﬀerences across regions brought about by
unequal economic growth during the long time horizon of our study. Our strategy is similar in spirit
to a within-province-year diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences (DD) strategy, where we compare the outcomes
of villages that have had their ﬁrst election to villages in the same province (and year) that have
not yet implemented their ﬁrst election. However, we control for province-time trends instead of the
more ﬂexible provinceyear ﬁxed eﬀects because we do not have enough variation to estimate the
latter. The closeness in timing of the introduction of elections for villages within the same province
means that there are many province-year cells within which there is no variation in election.
26The incentive eﬀect is present in both cases, but the selection eﬀect is only present when leaders are replaced.
27If the introduction of elections (with CCP nomination) compelled the CCP to select the candidates that the
villagers prefer, then ﬁnding no additional eﬀect of open nominations would not provide us with any additional
insights into whether better selection played a role.
28In principle, another mechanism that can cause elections to increase accountability is candidate competition.
The median voter literature suggests that candidate competition should favor candidates that run on platforms that
are preferred by a majority of voters. See Black (1948) and Downs (1957) for the classical exposition of this theory
and Persson and Tabellini (2000) for a modern textbook treatment. This is not very relevant to our context since
median voter models require candidates to be able to campaign on their platforms and to commit to the promises
made during the campaign, and there is little campaigning our context. In many cases, elections were set up with
only a few days’ notice (Unger, 2002: p. 221).
14In addition to estimating the eﬀect of introducing elections, our baseline speciﬁcation also es-
timates the eﬀect of whether an election is competitive and whether open nominations are used to
select the candidates. Since our data show that none of these policies were ever reversed after their
introduction, we control for them with dummy variables indicating “post” the year of introduction.
The baseline estimation can be characterized by the following equation:
Yvpt = Electionvpt + Competitivevpt + OpenNomvpt + pt + v + t + "vpt: (1)
Yvpt is the policy outcome of village v in province p during calendar year t. It is a function of:
whether the ﬁrst election, ﬁrst competitive election and the ﬁrst open nomination has taken place;
province-year trends, pt; village ﬁxed eﬀects, v; and calendar year ﬁxed eﬀects, t. All standard
errors are clustered at the village level. The main coeﬃcient of interest is . It will be statistically
diﬀerent from zero if elections had an eﬀect on a particular policy outcome.
Our empirical strategy assumes that the timing of the introduction of elections is uncorrelated
with other factors which may inﬂuence the outcomes of interest in the same way as a shift in leader
accountability towards villagers. Given the large set of outcomes we examine, we ﬁnd it unlikely
that our estimates are confounded in this way. Nevertheless, to be cautious, we present a large
number of robustness checks after we present the main results.
5 Data
Our study uses village-level data from a panel of 217 villages for the years 1980-2005. These data
are the result of merging two surveys. The ﬁrst one is the National Fixed-Point Survey (NFS), an
economic survey collected and maintained by a research centre of the Ministry of Agriculture of
China. It is a longitudinal village and household level survey that began in 1987. The villages were
chosen to be broadly nationally representative for rural China at the time the survey began. The
NFS data were collected annually during 1987-2005, with the exception of 1992 and 1994, when it
was not collected for administrative issues. The second survey is a unique retrospective survey on
the history of electoral reforms, de facto leader power, and policies that covers the years 1980-2005,
conducted by the authors of this paper in the NFS villages. We also obtained information about
the social structure (e.g., kinship clans and the presence of lineage groups) of these villages.29 The
Data Appendix provides further details on both data sources.
Our sample includes data from 25 out of 32 Chinese provinces. The four provinces that are
urban municipalities are not in our sample.30 We also exclude Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang.
These are autonomous regions dominated by ethnic minorities and are subject to diﬀerent political
and economic policies. The full sample includes all of NFS’s 217 villages from these 25 provinces.
However, for household level variables, the NFS only allowed us access to data for 72 of the 217
29Lineage groups refers to the presence of ancestral worship halls and written family trees, which according to
recent work by Tsai (2007), can aﬀect the provision of public goods in rural China.
30These are Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Chongqing. Note that the 31 provincial units do not include Hong
Kong or Macau.
15villages.31 This results in our having many fewer observations when we examine household outcomes.
The one exception is household income, which the Ministry of Agriculture agreed to tabulate for us
for each decile of the within-village household income distribution each year for each village.
Our data have several advantages. First, these are probably the most comprehensive data
on village-level reforms and village-level outcomes ever constructed. Our data cover a larger and
more nationally representative sample and span a longer time horizon than any other existing
data. In addition to recording the history of electoral reforms, we also recorded the timing of the
implementation of other major rural reforms and the occurrence of village mergers.32 This allows
us to control for heterogeneity across villages more comprehensively than past studies, which is
particularly important in a study of China during a period of large and widening disparity between
regions. Second, the NFS economic data is collected contemporaneously. This avoids measurement
error that would arise from using retrospectively recalled data on past details. Third, the panel
structure of the survey allows us to control for village ﬁxed eﬀects and province-year trends. Finally,
the richness of the data allows us to provide a detailed analysis of the eﬀect of elections across policy
types and to assess the mechanisms driving the reduced-form eﬀects.
The main drawback is that the variables included in the NFS change over time to meet the needs
of the Ministry of Agriculture. To maximize the accuracy and precision of our study, we focus on
variables that are collected consistently for most years. As a consequence, some interesting variables
that are only in the survey for very few years (e.g., obligated working days, roads) are not examined.
The second drawback is that the NFS, which is mainly an agricultural labor and production survey,
did not collect detailed demographic data. Therefore, we cannot examine outcomes such as yearly
changes in fertility, or explore the interaction of the eﬀects of elections and changes in the village
demographic structure. Finally, because we have only household-level data for 72 villages, our
estimates for these outcomes will be less precise.
5.1 Descriptive Statistics
Village Demographics Table 1 contains the descriptive statistics for the villages in our dataset.
All observations are at the village-year level. Panel A shows the means for the full sample. The
main facts that emerge is that our sample is very rural and very few villages are near cities.33 Land
expropriation by the upper government occurs rarely. Only in 4% of the village-year observations
experience upper-government land expropriation. However, exemptions to the One Child Policy
are allowed in half of the sample. In addition to the means shown in Table 1, we ﬁnd that the
average standard deviation of this variable within a province and year is 0.37, which shows that
there is substantial time and regional variation in the enforcement of tehe One Child Policy. This
31In order to maximize the sample size, we chose the 72 villages with the largest number of households.
32For example, our survey records the year that villages implemented the Household Responsibility reforms (mid-
1980s), which de-collectivized agricultural production, and the Tax and Fee Reforms (early 2000s), which reduced
village leaders’ ability to tax villagers.
33The number of observations vary because some of the measures, such as the size of the dominat clan, are not
relevant for all villages.
16supports the observation that local governments have some discretion over the implementation of
family planning policies. Table 1 also shows that approximately 60% of funding for village public
goods comes from village sources, which is consistent with the belief that one of the main roles of
the village government is to raise and target public investment. Most of the arable land (96%) is
allocated to household farming. For the remaining land, a third is typically leased out to village
enterprises and a third is managed collectively, which can be used for any purpose. The uses of the
residual third of the land held by the village government is not reported by the NSF.
Next, we examine the descriptive statistics for income. For the full sample of 217 villages,
the median household earns approximately 10,512 RMB of gross income per year.34 The median
household income of each village grows at 9.2% per annum on average, which is similar to the growth
rate for the national average during this period.
Panel B shows the descriptive statistics for select variables from the subsample of villages for
which we have household-level data. These villages are slightly larger in terms of the number of
households and have similar median income and income growth as the full sample of villages. In
addition to the descriptive statistics shown in Table 1, the disaggregated income data that we have
for this subsample shows that agriculture is very important for the incomes of households in our
sample (see Appendix Table A1 panel A).
One of the most important variables from this subsample is the amount of land allocated to
each household. The data highlight how little farmland rural Chinese households have. The median
household in a village has approximately 5.24 mu on average.35 The household subsample also
allows us to examine the amount of fees and levies paid by households to the village and county
governments, which amounts to 320 RMB per year on average. Unfortunately, the NFS does not
separately report fees paid to the village government from fees to the county government. Appendix
Table A1 panel A shows a more detailed account of household income and expenditure. Aside from
production costs and food and housing consumption, the main expenses are the payment of fees and
school tuition. This is consistent with past studies that argue that household fees are a contentious
issue within the village (e.g., Luo et al., 2007; Zhang et al., 2004).
Village Government Structure Panel C shows the descriptive statistics for the village govern-
ment. On average, there are four village committee members (including the VC) and seven party
committee members in the village party branch (including the PS). We only have data for VCs that
were in oﬃce before the ﬁrst election for sixteen villages.36 Within this small subsample, we observe
that 60% of the ﬁrst elections resulted in a change in the VC, showing that the initial elections
resulted in substantial turnover. If we examine all elections (and not just the ﬁrst), we ﬁnd that
46% of elections result in a change of VC, which shows that elections continued to generate leader
34During most of our study period, 1 RMB was approximately equal to 8 USD. The incomes we report are not
adjusted for inﬂation. In the regression analysis, price changes are largely absorbed in the year ﬁxed eﬀects and
province-time trends.
351 mu = 1/15th hectare.
36The surveyors collected data on the VCs and PSs for all villages and years after the ﬁrst election was introduced.
For sixteen villages, the surveyors also collected these data for all the years before the ﬁrst election.
17turnover.37
In Table 2, we document the power structure of the government by asking whether the VC or
the PS had the unilateral power to make important decisions or if consent from both was necessary
to reach a decision. Our survey question is phrased to reﬂect the de facto rules rather than the de
jure rules.38
Table 2 shows that there is substantial variation in the allocation of power and that VCs have
de facto power. VCs have unilateral powers to appoint managers of village enterprises in 32% of
the sample, to employ village-government employees in 27% of the sample, to reimburse expenses
in 56% of the sample, to reallocate land in 33% of the sample and to make large public investments
in 18% of the sample. Adding up the cases in which VCs have unilateral and joint power shows
that their consent is needed for important decisions in about 70-90% of the sample.
The Timing of the First Elections Panel D of Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics on
the timing of elections. It shows that the average village had held its ﬁrst election by 1988, its
ﬁrst competitive election by 1991 and its ﬁrst election with open nominations by 1997.39 There are
fewer observations for the latter two variables because not all villages had introduced these policies
by the end of our study period. Note that our regression analysis will include all villages because
villages that had not introduced certain policies will simply report those variables as zero.
Next, we examine the timing of the introduction of elections in each village relative to the
introduction in the same county and the same province. For county-level introductions, we can
rely on our survey, which asked each village to recall when the ﬁrst elections were held in the same
county (excluding the respondent village).40 As provinces are large and many villages will not know
the ﬁrst election in its province, we did not include such a question on the survey. Instead, we proxy
for the year of the ﬁrst election within a province with the year of the ﬁrst election in a province
that we observe in our data. Two facts emerge from these statistics. First, most villages introduce
elections at the same time as the rest of the county and very soon after the ﬁrst election in the same
province. In addition to the means presented in the table 1, we ﬁnd that 66% of villages introduce
elections together with the ﬁrst village of the same county. The negative sign of the mean diﬀerences
between average village and county timing is due to the fact that 15% of our villages were the ﬁrst
37Excluding the ﬁrst election, we have information about 1,043 electoral contests. Among those 477 lead to a
change of VC. This contrasts to 229 changes in the PS over the same period. The statistics for leader turnover are
not reported in Table 1.
38We used focus groups with village oﬃcials and elders to identify the most important policies for villages. We
focused on policies that were the most likely to be relevant for all villages across China. For each year, respondents
check boxes for whether the signature of the VC, PS or both are needed to implement each policy. Not all policies
are relevant to each village and time period. In case of an irrelevant policy, the variable is recorded as missing.
Therefore, the sample size varies across outcomes. Note that the land allocation question speciﬁcally refers to land
that is held by the village government and allocated at the sole discretion of the village government (e.g., jidongdi).
This is important because our empirical analysis of the eﬀect of elections on village land allocation only makes sense
if the VC has power over land allocation.
39See Appendix Table A2 for a more detailed timing of the introduction of these reforms.
4013 villages were unable to recall the year of the ﬁrst election in their county. Therefore, our sample size for this
variables is slightly reduced.
18to introduce elections in their county.41 Second, the villages in our sample include those that held
their ﬁrst elections before, at the same time as and after the ﬁrst election held in the same county,
which is consistent with our villages being a random sample.
Electoral Procedures There are substantial diﬀerences in electoral procedures beyond the num-
ber of candidates discussed earlier. Panel D of Table 1 also shows that there is substantial het-
erogeneity in electoral procedures. Approximately 84% of elections have anonymous voting, 72%
allow voting by proxy and 65% use a roving ballot box. Despite the mandate of holding competitive
elections, only 79% of elections follow this requirement. These facts are consistent with previous
observations that many elections are procedurally unsound.42
In addition to the statistics shown in the table, we also investigate the frequency of elections.
Although 80% of elections occurred exactly three years after the previous one (as stipulated by law),
over 10% of elections follow the previous one within one or two years. Interestingly, all of these
high-frequency elections occurred immediately after the initial introduction of elections. Moreover,
they typically occurred after elections that were not competitive. The fact that non-competitive
elections were systematically followed by additional elections before the term’s end is consistent
with the qualitative accounts of dissatisﬁed villagers demanding and obtaining recalls provided by
O’Brien and Li (2006) and the belief that the introduction of elections could shift accountability of
village government towards villagers even when the elections were very imperfect.
6 Main Results
This section presents our main empirical results. First, we check that elected leaders have power
over policy decisions by estimating the eﬀects of the introduction of elections on the de facto power
of leaders. Second, we present the estimated eﬀects of elections on Type I policies to infer whether
elections increased the VCs accountability towards villagers. Then we examine the eﬀects of elections
on Type III (e.g., placebo) policies to check that elections do not aﬀect policies that the VCs have
little discretion over. Finally, we examine the eﬀect on Type II policies to investigate whether
villagers are better than the upper government in monitoring the VC.
6.1 The Eﬀect on Leader Powers
First, we examine the eﬀects of elections on de facto leader powers. The estimates for the baseline
equation (1) are shown in Table 3. The estimates in rows (1)-(5) show that elections increase the
unilateral power of the VC for each of the village powers in our survey. With the exception of the
41In addition to the statistics reported in the table, we ﬁnd that over 60% of villages within a province introduced
elections within three years of the ﬁrst election in that province.
42Several past studies have observed that the quality of the electoral procedures is highly uneven (Brandt et al.,
2004; Pang and Rozelle, 2006; Birney, 2007). A roving ballot can decrease the ability of citizens to monitor the ballot
box and facilitate ballot stuﬃng. Similarly, the lack of anonymous ballots could increase the pressure on villagers to
vote for a particular candidate. Allowing villagers to vote in proxy of family members that are away can be important
in the context of villages where many workers work away from the village part of the year.
19power to employ village staﬀ, they are signiﬁcant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. This is paralleled
by a decrease in the unilateral powers of the PS shown in rows (11)-(15), which are also statistically
signiﬁcant at the 5% and 1% levels with the exception of the power to employ staﬀ. Elections have
no eﬀect on the incidence of the PSs and VCs holding powers jointly. These results are important
because they show that the newly elected leaders had powers to implement policies. Otherwise, it
would not make sense to infer a shift in leader accountability from the estimated eﬀect of elections
on policy outcomes. Moreover, they are consistent with the belief of the proponents of reform that
elections increase the de facto power of the elected oﬃcial by giving him a democratic mandate.
Interestingly, the subsequent introductions of competitive elections and open nominations do not
have additional eﬀects. The estimates are mostly small in magnitude and statistically insigniﬁcant.
Note that the estimated magnitude for the introduction of the ﬁrst election is similar if we do not
control for the subsequent introductions of competitive elections and open nominations. However,
not controlling for this additional heterogeneity causes the election estimates to be less precise.
Therefore, we include these controls in all of our speciﬁcations.43
6.2 Eﬀect on Upper-Government Policy
As we discussed earlier, an increase in leader accountability towards villagers (due to the introduction
of elections) has diﬀerent eﬀects across policy types. Speciﬁcally, it depends on whether the village
government has any discretion over the policy and the congruence between the preferences of the
upper government and villagers. Our simple model predicts that if elections increase accountability
towards the villagers, then upper-government policies that are unpopular with villagers will shift
towards the preferences of villagers if VCs have any discretion over them (i.e., Type I policies). It
also predicts that elections should have no eﬀect on policies over which the village government has
no discretion (i.e., Type III policies). We examine these predictions in Table 4.
The two Type I polices that we examine are the One Child Policy and upper-government land
expropriation (recall the discussion from section 3). Column (1) shows the estimates of the eﬀect of
elections on the implementation of One Child Policy exemptions. Elections increase the incidence
of relaxations in the One Child Policy by 8.2 percentage-points. Since approximately 50% of our
observations allow the exemption, this represents a 16% increase in the likelihood of exemptions.
The estimate is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Column (2) examines the eﬀects of elections
on the probability of village land being expropriated by upper-level governments. As we can see,
this probability is reduced by 1.8 percentage-points once elections are introduced. However, the
point estimate is only statistically signiﬁcant at the 15% level. The lack of precision most likely
reﬂects the fact that there is very little variation in this measure because land expropriation rarely
occurs; only 3.6% of our sample experiences land expropriation by the upper government. This also
means that the estimated magnitude implies a large eﬀect and that elections approximately reduce
the average incidence of land expropriation by 49%.
43The estimates without controlling for competitive elections and open nominations are not reported in the paper
for the sake of brevity. They are available upon request.
20In contrast, we ﬁnd that elections have no eﬀect on Type III policies that the village government
has little discretion over. Columns (3) and (4) show that elections have no eﬀect on the amount of
public investment from special aid funds or distance to the nearest high school.
These results are consistent with the predictions of our model when elections increase leader
accountability towards villagers. More speciﬁcally, the ﬁnding that elections reduce unpopular poli-
cies means that elections shift Type I policies towards the preferences of villagers. This implies that
the introduction of elections indeed increased leader accountability towards villagers. The ﬁnding
that elections had no eﬀect on Type III policies reinforces our interpretation that the estimated
eﬀects on Type I policies are driven by a shift in local leader accountability rather than by other
mechanisms.
As with the results on leader powers, we ﬁnd that the introduction of open nominations and
competitive nominations have little additional eﬀect.
6.3 The Eﬀect on Public Goods Investment and Village Land Allocation
Next, we analyze the eﬀect of elections on public goods provision and within-village land allocation.
These polices correspond to the Type II policies in our model, for which villagers and the upper
government share similar preferences but a proper implementation is costly to the village leader.
Our model predicts that a shift in accountability towards villagers shifts these policies towards the
preferences of the villagers only if villagers are better than the upper government at monitoring and
restraining the VC.
Table 5 shows the results on the eﬀect of elections on public investment according to the sources
of funding. For the sake of brevity, we do not report the estimates for post-ﬁrst competitive election
and post-ﬁrst open nomination. Panel A shows the results for total public investment for all
public goods. Column (1) shows that elections increase total public investment from all sources by
approximately 17.5%. However, it is only signiﬁcant at the 15% level. Columns (2)-(7) disaggregate
village expenditure in public goods by source of funding. A comparison of the magnitude of the
coeﬃcients in column (1) and those in columns (2)-(7) suggest that the aggregate increase is driven
by an increase in funding from villagers. However, these estimates are not statistically signiﬁcant.
The imprecision is very likely due to heterogeneity in the demand for public goods.
To address this issue, we predict the demand for public goods with village characteristics. Our
data allows us to do this for two public goods: irrigation and schooling. Presumably, villagers living
in villages where there is more household farming will demand more irrigation and those who live
in villages with more children will have higher demand for schools. In order to examine the eﬀect of
elections on irrigation investment, we estimate an equation similar to the baseline equation, except
that we add the interaction terms that interact the introduction of elections, competitive elections
and open nominations with the average log amount of village land used for household farming.
Similarly, to examine the eﬀect on schooling investment, we add interaction terms that interact the
three policy variables with the average number of children of ages 7-13 in a village.
Panel B in Table 5 shows the eﬀects on irrigation investment. The estimate for the main eﬀect
21of post-ﬁrst election in column (1) shows that elections reduce public investment in irrigation for
villages with no household farmland. However, the interaction eﬀect between elections and average
log household farmland is positive. Both the main and interaction eﬀects are statistically signiﬁcant
at the 1% level. Taken literally, the estimates show that elections increase public investment in
irrigation for villages that have 6.5 or more log mu of land (the sample mean is 7.23 log mu). The
elasticity of household farm land with respect to the eﬀect of elections on public investment in
irrigation is 0.37.
In Panel C, we examine the eﬀect on public investment in schooling. Column (1) shows that
elections have no eﬀect on public investment in schooling for villages with no children. In fact, the
sign of the estimate is negative. However, the introduction of elections increases public investment
for villages with more children. The interaction term is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Note
that all of the coeﬃcients for schooling are scaled by 1,000 for ease of presentation. Therefore, the
results show that elections increase public investment in schooling from villagers for the average
village, which has approximately 234 school age children, by 0.4% (2340:0154=1000) more than a
village with no children. This is a small eﬀect. However, the result is consistent with the observation
that elections increase the provision in public goods for which there is stronger demand from the
villagers.
The estimates in Panels B and C provide strong evidence that elections increase appropriate
provision of public goods. Furthermore, a comparison of columns (2) to columns (3)-(7) shows that
the eﬀects of elections on public investment are entirely driven by increases in funding from villagers.
The estimated main eﬀects and interaction eﬀects for investment funded by sources other than from
the village government are statistically insigniﬁcant and much smaller in magnitude, relative to
investment funded by villagers. These results are important because they show that the estimated
eﬀects on public goods are driven by changes in policies that the village leader has much discretion
over and not by a change that he has little discretion over. This reinforces our interpretation that
our results capture a change in village leader accountability.
As a consistency check, we investigate the eﬀect of elections on fees paid by households. Since
we ﬁnd that elections increase the amount of village funding for public goods, we would also expect
elections to increase the amount of fees paid by villagers to the village government, which we can
only observe together with the fees paid to the county government. Using the subsample of villages
for which we have household data, we ﬁnd that elections indeed increase the total amount of fees
paid to the village and county. These results are shown in Appendix Table A3.
Table 6 shows the estimates for the eﬀects of elections on within-village land allocation. We
examine the eﬀects on each decile of the within-village distribution of land allocation to investigate
whether elections induce redistribution. Columns (1)-(9) show that the estimated coeﬃcients are
positive for the entire distribution. However, they are larger in magnitude and more precisely
estimated for households near the median. Columns (4)-(6) show that the introduction of elections
increases household farmland by approximately 20-28% for the 40th, 50th and 60th percentile
22households. They are statistically signiﬁcant at the 10%, 1% and 10% levels.44 These results
show that elections increased land holding for some households, but there is no obvious evidence of
land redistribution across households.
As a consistency check, we investigate whether the increase in household farmland was made
possible by a reduction in the land managed directly by the village government. Recall from
section 3 that this land is often leased to village enterprises or farmers and is a source of rents for
corrupt village oﬃcials. The NFS only reports the portion that is leased out to ﬁrms or managed
collectively, which on average comprises approximately two-thirds of all village government managed
land. Because village-government-managed land is typically used for one purpose or another for
any given village, we restrict the sample to observations that lease some land out to ﬁrms and to
observations that manage some land collectively. Columns (10)-(11) show that for these subsamples,
elections reduced the amount of land leased to ﬁrms by approximately 68% and the amount of land
managed collectively by approximately 71%. The estimates are statistically signiﬁcant at the 10%
level. These results show that the increase in household land caused by elections was paralleled
by a reduction of land that is managed by the government. Note that this is consistent with our
earlier ﬁnding that the unilateral powers of the VC to reallocate government-held land increased
after elections were introduced.
As with all of the earlier results, we ﬁnd no conclusive evidence that the introduction of open
nominations and competitive elections have additional eﬀects. The estimated coeﬃcients are smaller
in magnitude and statistically insigniﬁcant.
The interpretation of the eﬀects on public goods investment is straightforward. Under the
assumption that the upper government shares the preferences of the villagers, our ﬁndings are
consistent with elections making the village government more accountable to villagers. They also
suggest that villagers are better than the upper levels of government at monitoring and restraining
village leaders. Interpreting the results on land allocation in the same way requires the assumption
that villagers want more land for farming at the expense of reducing the amount of land controlled
by the village government. This could occur, for example, if the revenues generated from the
government-controlled land were not equitably distributed amongst villagers so that a large portion
of villagers preferred to control the land directly.45
44For land allocation and all other outcomes that we examine by quantile, we estimate the distribution for each
year. Therefore, a given household that is at the 10th percentile in year X, might not be on the 10th percentile in
year Y . For robustness, we check that our results are similar if we use a time-invariant deﬁnition. Since the results
are very similar (because there is little change in the relative positions of households on the village distribution of
land or income), we only report the time-varying deﬁnition in the paper. The other results are available upon request.
45We examine the eﬀects of elections on household incomes by source and ﬁnd suggestive evidence that elections
reduce household income from village enterprises (e.g., dividends) and income from wages, which are often earned by
working for village enterprises. Richer households experienced larger reductions, which suggests that they beneﬁted
more from the enterprises occupying government-controlled land. However, the estimates are very imprecise due to
the fact that we only have data on income by source for 72 villages. See Appendix Table A4.
In addition to the main results, our model also makes the auxiliary prediction that an increase in accountability
will increase the provision of excludable goods only for as many households as the number of votes the VC requires
for remaining in oﬃce. These theoretical results are available upon request. Since farmland is an excludable good,
the ﬁnding that elections only increase land allocation for some households within the village is consistent with this
auxiliary prediction.
237 Robustness
Causal interpretation of the baseline estimates assumes that the timing of the introduction of
elections in villages (within provinces) was not correlated with other factors that could inﬂuence
our outcomes of interest. Given the large and diverse set of outcomes that we examine, we ﬁnd
it unlikely that an omitted factor could aﬀect all of these outcomes, including the placebos, in
exactly the same way as an increase in local leader accountability. Nevertheless, to be cautious, we
discuss and address potential threats in this section. First, we check that the timing of the eﬀect of
elections on the outcomes corresponds closely to the timing of the ﬁrst election, rather than spurious
changes that may have occurred some years before or after the election. Second, we address the
possibility that the timing of the introduction of elections was endogenous to other factors that
can inﬂuence our outcomes of interest. Third, we address the related concern that villages that
introduced elections before the national OLVC law diﬀered from villages that introduced elections
afterwards. Finally, we discuss alternative explanations for our ﬁndings.
7.1 Year-by-Year Estimates
We estimate the eﬀect of the introduction of elections for each year before and after the ﬁrst election
to check that changes in the outcome of interest occur when elections are ﬁrst introduced, or closely
afterwards. We estimate an equation that is similar to the baseline except that we introduce dummy
variables for the number of years since the ﬁrst election. The outcomes we examine are limited to
those that have suﬃcient variation within each year. We only extend the pre-election analysis to
four years prior to the ﬁrst election to avoid losing too many villages that introduced elections early.
Similarly, we examine up to six years after the ﬁrst election to avoid losing villages that introduced
elections towards the end of our sample.
Figure 1 plots the estimated coeﬃcients for the correlation between the dummy variable for
each year before and after the ﬁrst election and the power of the VC and PS to unilaterally appoint
village enterprise managers. The plotted coeﬃcients show that there is little change in the three
years prior to the ﬁrst election. However, the likelihood that VCs would have unilateral power
instead of the party secretary immediately increases after the ﬁrst election. The same pattern exists
for all other decision power measures (see Appendix table A5).
Figure 2 shows the estimated eﬀects for whether One Child Policy exemptions were granted in
a village. As with village leader powers, we see no eﬀect in the years leading up to the introduction
of the ﬁrst election but a jump to a positive correlation in the years afterwards.
We repeat this exercise for land holdings of the median household. Because this variable is
only reported from 1987 onwards, we can only extend the analysis to two years prior to the ﬁrst
election without losing too many villages from the estimating sample. The estimated coeﬃcients are
plotted in Figure 3. Figure 3 shows no change between one and two years before the introduction
of elections. After the introduction, villages gradually allocate more land to the median household.
The estimated coeﬃcients and standard errors for these policy outcomes are shown in Appendix
24table A5.
These results illustrate that the eﬀects of elections occur at the time of the ﬁrst election or
shortly thereafter, which partly alleviates the concern that our main pre-post comparison captures
spurious changes. Note that the estimates provide no evidence of pre-trends.46
7.2 Endogeneity of Election Timing
Our main concern is that our estimates are biased by the fact that the upper government delayed
elections for villages that had a history of resisting central policies. If the upper government success-
fully delays introducing elections in villages that will deviate the most from central policies, then
our estimates of the eﬀect of elections on reducing the enforcement of upper-government policies
are clearly attenuated.47
Delaying the introduction of elections for such villages is unlikely to bias our estimates of the
eﬀect of elections on public goods provision since the upper government has little stake in this out-
come. However, our strategy could over-estimate the eﬀect of elections on within-village household
land allocation. One of the stated motivations of introducing elections was to reduce corruption
by allowing citizen monitoring. Since one of the most common ways for village leaders to earn
rents is from government-held land, one may worry that upper governments introduced elections
earlier in villages that experienced more corruption. Thus, our estimated eﬀects of elections on land
allocation may overstate the true eﬀects. In this section, we address this and many other concerns.
It is convenient to categorize the potential bias as two types: bias arising from heterogeneity
across villages within counties and bias arising from heterogeneity across counties. We can address
the ﬁrst type of bias by instrumenting for the timing of the ﬁrst election in each village with the
timing of the ﬁrst election in the same county. For example, if the upper government introduced
elections in villages where the demand for additional farmland was greater, then instrumenting
for village timing with county timing can remove the endogeneity from diﬀerences across villages
within counties. The causal interpretation of this instrumental variables strategy also assumes
that the introduction of elections at the county level is not systematically correlated with village
level factors of the villages in our sample that aﬀect the outcomes of interest. This seems highly
46Moreover, the discrete change in the coeﬃcients after elections were introduced suggests that our main speciﬁca-
tion, which estimates the average eﬀect of elections across all the years after their introduction, will be appropriate
for capturing the eﬀect of elections. For the estimates on household land allocation, the gradual and approximately
linear change in the coeﬃcients after the introduction of elections suggests that estimating the eﬀect of the number
of years since the ﬁrst election may be more appropriate than our main speciﬁcation for capturing the cumulative
eﬀects of elections after they were introduced. When we estimate this alternative speciﬁcation, we obtain statistically
signiﬁcant estimates that imply the same average eﬀects as our main results. Therefore, for the sake of brevity
and consistency, we only report the results from our main speciﬁcation in the paper. The alternative estimates are
available upon request.
47If problematic villages do not enforce central policies even before elections, then it is possible that they have a
smaller margin for change after elections are introduced. This could cause our estimate to overstate the true eﬀects
of elections on reducing the enforcement of unpopular central policies. To address this, we control for the average
incidence of One Child Policy exemptions and the upper government expropriation of land for each village, each
interacted with the full set of year dummy variables, in our baseline regression. Our results are unchanged when
the interactions controls are included. Therefore, we conclude that they are not biased upwards by pre-election
non-compliance. The estimates are presented later in the paper.
25unlikely since our sample villages are randomly chosen from the counties they are in and each
county typically contains over 200 villages. Even if counties decided to introduce elections based
on the unobserved characteristics of certain villages, it is highly unlikely that they systematically
made this decision based on the villages in our sample. The ﬁrst stage and 2SLS estimates are
shown in Table 7.48 The ﬁrst stage estimates are very strong and signiﬁcant. The 2SLS estimates
have the same sign as our baseline estimates but are larger in magnitude. They are almost all
statistically signiﬁcant. Therefore, we conclude that our baseline estimates are not biased upwards
(in magnitude) by heterogeneity within counties.
It is more diﬃcult to address the omitted variables bias caused by heterogeneity across counties.
We do not have a convincing source of plausibly exogenous variation in timing at the county level that
we can use as an excludable instrument. Therefore, we address this diﬃculty by directly controlling
for potentially confounding factors. We identify these factors as the correlates of the year of the
introduction of elections across villages (within provinces). Our choice of correlates is motivated by
qualitative studies on the motives for elections, such as poor enforcement of central policies, and
the factors that are most likely to cause discontent amongst villagers.49 We experimented with a
large number of diﬀerent speciﬁcations and ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant correlates for election
timing. This is consistent with the claim that election timing was, for the most part, quasi-random
within provinces. However, one may be concerned that the timing of elections is correlated with
unobservable factors that inﬂuence our outcomes of interest or that the estimated correlates using a
217-village cross section can be misleading due to a lack of power and vulnerability to collinearity.
Therefore, to be cautious, we control for these factors and all of the other factors which could be
potentially confounding in Tables 8 and 9.
The robustness checks in Table 8 focus on factors that are most likely to be directly related to
latent demand for the policy outcomes that we examine. For each variable, we calculate a time-
invariant village average to address the concern that the time varying measures may be outcomes
of elections. We then interact the village averages of each characteristic with the full set of time
dummies to allow the eﬀects to vary fully ﬂexibly over time.50 The robustness controls include the
48Note that we only have enough variation for the 2SLS estimates with our full sample variables. We use two
speciﬁcations, one where we only instrument for the ﬁrst elections, and a second where we instrument for the ﬁrst
election and ﬁrst open nominations. Our survey also asked each village to recall the ﬁrst open nomination by any
village in the same county. Table 7 shows that the two speciﬁcations yield very similar results.
49We examine the correlates of timing in the cross section. To make our estimates comparable to the baseline,
we demean the data by province-year trends and then aggregate the data to the village level. The outcome variable
of interest is the year of the ﬁrst election in the village. The correlates we examined were the village averages
of population, population growth rate, fertility, the incidence of upper-government land expropriation, village land
allocated for household farming, a dummy for whether a village is near a large city, household income and income
growth for the 10th, 50th and 90th percentile households, income inequality and the growth rate of income inequality.
We also examine the relationship between election timing and the presence of a lineage group and the size of the
largest kinship clan. On the smaller 72 village household data subsample, we replace the income measures with
analogous household land measures. Due to space constraints, we do not present these correlates in the paper. They
are available upon request. Note that many demographic variables, such as fertility, are reported by the NFS in only
a few years. Therefore, we cannot examine them as outcomes in the main analysis. However, for these robustness
exercises, we are able to use them by calculating a village average over time and interacting them with year ﬁxed
eﬀects.
50Note that we can alternatively use the village averages calculated from the years prior to the ﬁrst election in each
26interaction terms of the full set of year ﬁxed eﬀects with the village averages of: median household
land allocation, household land inequality (measured as the land holding of the 90th percentile
household divided by the land holding of the median household), total village land used for house-
hold farming, land leased to ﬁrms, the incidence of upper-government land expropriation, whether
the village is part of the suburbs of a city, household fees paid to the county and village level gov-
ernments, fertility rates, the percentage of laborers, the incidence of One Child Policy exemptions,
median household income, household income inequality and household income growth. Some of
these additional controls are only available for the 72-village sample with household-level data. As
a result, we cannot estimate the eﬀect of elections on public investments with these robustness
controls because public investments occur very infrequently and we do not have enough variation
in the data.
We present the baseline estimates for each of our outcomes for comparison purposes in column
(1) and then add the controls individually in columns (2)-(10). In column (15), we control for all of
these factors in one regression. In Panels C, D and E, the estimates change in magnitude when the
sample changes from the full 217 villages to the 72 villages with household data. We ﬁnd a similar
change in magnitude when we estimate the baseline equation using the restricted sample without
any additional robustness controls.51 The additional controls have almost no eﬀect on the estimated
magnitudes of the coeﬃcients.52 Therefore, we conclude that our main estimates are robust to the
factors that are most likely to inﬂuence the policy outcomes we examine.
In Table 9, we examine additional factors that may inﬂuence the adoption or eﬀectiveness of
elections. As before, we present the baseline estimates for comparison in column (1). We examine
the inﬂuence of election procedures discussed in section 5: the presence of a roving ballot box,
anonymous ballots and proxy ballots, which could all corrupt the election process. We control for
these electoral procedures in column (2). The estimates are very similar to the baseline for all
outcomes.
Another factor that can inﬂuence the eﬀect of elections is the share of the largest clan. When
elections were introduced, many oﬃcials feared that a large extended family would dominate elec-
tions and then use its power in the elected oﬃce to implement policies which may not be beneﬁcial
for the rest of the villagers. Alternatively, having a large dominant clan could facilitate coordination
in making decisions for policies such as public goods. In column (3), we control for the interaction
of the fraction of the village that comprises the largest clan, a time-invariant variable, with year
ﬁxed eﬀects. Our estimates are robust to these controls.53
Next, we consider Tsai (2007)’s argument that strong informal institutions are major determi-
village. This does not aﬀect our results. Therefore, they are not shown for the sake of brevity, but they are available
upon request.
51These are not reported for the sake of brevity. They are available upon request.
52Note that we also checked that our results (in particular, the estimate for public investment in schooling) are
robust to the inclusion of the average number of children interacted with year ﬁxed eﬀects. These regressions are not
included for the sake of brevity. They are available upon request.
53We also used alternative measures, such as the share of the largest two clans and a dummy for whether the largest
clan was more than half of the village population, as controls. The estimates are very similar to the baseline. They
are not reported for the sake of brevity and are available upon request.
27nants of policy outcomes, which could weaken the eﬀect of elections. We follow her work in using
the presence of a lineage group, which is measured as the presence of a household with a family tree
or an ancestral temple, to proxy for informal institutions (e.g., social capital). In column (4), we
control for the interactions of each of these variables with year ﬁxed eﬀects. The estimates are very
similar to the baseline.
In column (5), we control for the introduction of the Tax and Fee Reform, which restricted the
collection of fees by village governments. Since such fees were the main source of funding for village
public goods, especially in poor villages, this would greatly curb the village government’s ability to
provide public goods.54 We investigate whether our baseline results, particularly those on public
goods investment, are robust to controlling for the introduction of this reform. The estimates in
column (5) show that our main results are robust to controlling for this reform.
In column (6), we control for whether a village had experienced a merger with another village.
Approximately 19% of our sample ever experienced a merger at some point.55 To address this, we
asked villages in our survey to report the years they experienced mergers. We created a dummy
variable indicating whether a village ever experienced a merger (since 1952), then control for the
interaction of this dummy variable with year ﬁxed eﬀects. As we can see from column (6), the
estimated eﬀect of elections is very similar in magnitude to the baseline.56
Finally, in column (7), we control for all of the factors described above simultaneously. This rig-
orous speciﬁcation produces estimates that are very similar in magnitude to the baseline. Therefore,
we conclude that our main results are robust to controlling for a large host of additional factors.
7.3 Early Movers
Another concern related to heterogeneity and election timing is the possibility that villages that
held their ﬁrst elections before the OLVC in 1987 were diﬀerent from villages that held their ﬁrst
elections afterwards. For example, provincial governments may have ﬁrst introduced elections in
villages that were see to beneﬁt from elections but delay introducing elections in other villages
until they were required to by the national law. In that case, our estimates will misrepresent the
true average eﬀect of elections. To address this, we re-estimate our baseline regression on a sample
restricted to villages that held their ﬁrst election after 1987. Table 10 shows a comparison of the
54Our survey asked each village to report the introduction of the Tax and Fee Reform (and the introduction of the
Household Responsibility System). The data show that the timing of the introduction of these policies is uncorrelated
with the timing of the introduction of elections. Hence, it is quite unlikely that our estimates are confounded by
these other policies.
55This could be problematic for our data because our retrospective survey in 2006 allowed villages to provide the
electoral history of only one village. If a village was merged with another in the past, it is not clear which village
is being represented in the historical survey. The NFS data faces similar problems. A second potential problem
comes from the possibility that villages that have been merged with other villages can have very diﬀerent electoral
experiences. For one, merged villages may have more heterogeneity in their constituents, which could aﬀect electoral
outcomes. Alternatively, one may worry that villages which experienced mergers were either particularly problematic
or prosperous villages that also introduced elections systematically earlier or later.
56The estimates are also similar in magnitude to the baseline if we drop villages that have ever experienced a
merger, but they are less precise. We do not show these results for the sake of brevity. They are available upon
request.
28results on the restricted sample with our baseline estimates. They are very similar.57
7.4 Alternative Interpretations
Finally, one may be concerned that our outcomes may be driven by changes in upper-government
policies that occurred with the introduction of elections rather than by a shift in leader accountability
caused by the introduction of elections. For example, the upper government may induce villages to
introduce elections by favoring them with advantageous policies. If it relaxed the One Child Policy
or rescinded land expropriation requests at the same time that it introduced elections in villages,
then our results would partly reﬂect upper-government favoritism. This is mostly a concern for
our estimates of the eﬀect of elections on policies that the upper government has control over (e.g.,
upper-government land expropriation, implementation of the One Child Policy, and the part of
public goods funded by the upper government).
We show several pieces of evidence against this alternative explanation. First, if the upper
government systematically favored certain villages with advantageous policies after the introduction
of elections, then one would expect this favoritism to also appear in policies under the sole control
of the upper government. Such policies are arguably easier for the upper government to change as it
can do so unilaterally. This is inconsistent with our results, which show that elections do not aﬀect
two policies that villagers clearly favor and are under the sole discretion of the upper government:
special aid for below poverty line households and the distance to secondary schools. Second, our
results on public goods provision show that the increase in public investment caused by elections is
entirely driven by funding from villagers. There is no eﬀect on funding from other sources. These
results provide additional evidence against the alternative interpretation that our strategy captures
the eﬀect of upper-government favoritism rather than a shift in leader accountability.
8 Conclusion
In this study, we collect a unique dataset on the political history of rural Chinese villages that
we match to economic data that the Chinese government collected contemporaneously. Our data
covers most of rural China and most of the post-1976 reform era. We develop a simple framework
for understanding the eﬀects of a change in local leader accountability on village policies. Our
ﬁndings show that elections changed policy outcomes in a pattern that is entirely consistent with an
increase in village leader accountability towards villagers. Therefore, they provide strong evidence
that a local shift towards democracy can eﬀectively increase local leader accountability towards his
constituents, even if the overall regime is authoritarian.
The results provide several additional insights. First, the ﬁnding that the introduction of open
nominations has no clear incremental eﬀect suggests that the increase in accountability is more likely
57In addition, we also test whether our results are driven by underlying trends by randomly generating the year of
the ﬁrst election and estimating the eﬀects of this random election. We ﬁnd that the randomly generated elections
have no eﬀect. These results are not reported in the paper for the sake of brevity. They are available upon request.
29to be driven by stronger incentives rather than by better selection of leaders. Second, the ﬁnding
that elections aﬀect policy outcomes, even for policies that villagers and the upper government have
similar preferences for, suggests that the villagers have an advantage in monitoring village leaders.
For policy makers, our results indicate that making local oﬃcials more accountable to the pop-
ulation at large can have noticeable eﬀects on policy even if such changes are marginal, imperfectly
implemented and occur in a broader context of authoritarianism. This is important for the debate
on political institutional change because it suggests that wholesale reforms at all levels of a regime
might not be necessary to obtain noticeable beneﬁts for the population at large. Furthermore, the
ﬁndings show that local democracy poses a trade-oﬀ for the authoritarian central regime. On the
one hand, local democracy reduces the enforcement of certain unpopular central policies. On the
other hand, elected village leaders seem to be able to better provide for the needs of villagers on
average. This could be beneﬁcial for the regime in the long run by decreasing the probability of
political unrest.
The Chinese context and the data that we have collected provides a promising ground for
future research on the eﬀect of local governance changes within an authoritarian regime. Our
future research includes studies of the interactions between formal institutions, such as elections and
informal institutions, such as social capital, which can help us understand the pre-conditions for
successful institutional change. We also plan to explore the hypothesis that China’s authoritarian
central government is using local elections to obtain information from a large, heterogenous and
rapidly changing country by studying the eﬀects of local elections on the characteristics of CCP
appointees over time. Similarly, our next survey will also collect data on the occupations and
incomes of elected and appointed leaders and their family before and after they are in oﬃce to
better understand the incentives of these politicians and bureaucrats.
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Appendix
Model
Our framework applies the insights from the political agency literature to the context of rural
China. The introduction of elections shifts the situation of village leaders from being exclusively
accountable to upper levels of government to being accountable to both villagers and upper levels
34of government. We therefore need a framework that can capture three levels of players: the village
government, the upper levels of government and villagers.58
Consider a model with a continuum of size 1 of villagers (V), one village leader (VC) and an
upper-government superior (S), which can be any oﬃcial at the county level or above. The VC
decides on two types of policies. The ﬁrst type includes policies that V and S disagree over. We call
these policies Type I policies and denote the VC’s decisions on this type of policies m 2 [m;m]. The
second type of policies includes all policy dimensions that V and S agree on but implementing them
leads to a reduction of the VC’s utility.59 We call these policies Type II policies, and we denote the
VC’s decisions by a 2 [a;a].60
We assume that the preferences of villager i are additively separable in these two sets of policies
and given by UV
i = m + a + ", where " captures other elements that aﬀect V’s utility. We assume
that "  N(0;2




i di = m + a + ":
The S has a dual mandate: keep villagers content and comply with central government policies.
We therefore have
US = UV   c(m)
where c() is an increasing, convex and twice diﬀerentiable function. c(m) captures the cost that
S bears if there is a lax implementation of central government policies. This cost includes the
reprimands from superiors and the negative career consequences on bureaucrats that are seen as
failing to implement central directives. Because the upper government is responsible for many
villages, each of which has its own particular preferences and experiences some unique shocks, we
assume that the upper government cannot perfectly observe V’s utility and instead only observes
an informative signal. Denote this signal by s = UV + , where   N(0;2
) and is independently
distributed from ". When S takes the decision to retain or replace the VC, it can only use this noisy
measure
~ US = s   c(m):
We assume that the VC values being in oﬃce and suﬀers a loss, l(a), associated with the
implementation of Type II policies, where l() is an increasing, convex and twice diﬀerentiable
function. This loss captures both economic or social rents lost, or eﬀort exerted in such policy
58Our model focuses on the incentive channel because it is the most relevant for our context and for simplicity.
Adding selection does not change the main results. For the sake of brevity, this extension is not shown in the paper.
It is available upon request.
59For example, any policy that constrains the ability of VC to skim funds or requires exerting costly eﬀort would
belong to this category (i.e., leasing land to enterprises or provision of appropriate public goods.)
60The results of the model do not change if the implementation of Type I policies also carry a cost component for
the VC, as would be the case when the VC lobbies S for the relaxation of an unpopular upper-government policy. To
keep the conceptual distinction clean between the two loci of conﬂict, in what follows we ignore the leader’s costs in
Type I policies.
35implementation. We assume that the value of retaining the village leadership position is 1.61
The decision to keep or replace the VC as a function of the observed outcomes is made by S
before elections are introduced,and by V and S after elections. We denote by  the weight that V’s
opinion receives in this decision. Before elections are introduced,  = 0. As discussed in section 2,
village elections were imperfectly implemented and the village CCP branch were not directly aﬀected
by the electoral reforms. To capture this reality, we assume that after elections are introduced, the
upper government continues to decide on the retention of VC with exogenous probability 1   . In
contrast, with probability , the VC is re-elected according to villagers’ votes. This uncertainty
from the point of view of the VC also captures the mutable nature of elections in the ﬁrst few years
of implementation, which are the focus of our analysis. A village with higher  is thus one in which
the will of the villagers has stronger inﬂuence on re-election decisions.
In keeping with the theoretical literature, we consider threshold strategies k0 and k00 for villagers
and the upper government, respectively, such that at the time of deciding, they retain the VC if
their satisfaction is above the threshold.62 Facing these strategies, the VC maximizes
max
a;m Pr(UV
i  k0) + (1   )Pr(US  k00)   l(a): (2)
The following proposition describes how policies change as a result of a shift in accountability.
Proposition 1 As  increases, implemented policies react as follows:
1. m unambiguously increases
2. a increases if and only if 2
 > 0.
Proof. The ﬁrst-order conditions of the program are
f
 
k0   a   m;2
"














k0   a   m;2
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where f(.) is the pdf of a normal distribution. V and S want to maximize their eﬀective weight in
the decision taken by the VC. In the face of these reaction functions, the optimal cutoﬀs for villagers
and township are k0 = a + m and k00 = a + m   c(m), where a and m are the equilibrium
61Note that this is more than a normalization. The value of holding oﬃce might be diﬀerent across regimes.
However, the sign of this diﬀerence is far from obvious. If democracy is better at reining in corruption, the value
of oﬃce will be lower. At the same time, however, the legitimacy that being democratically elected confers might
increase the ego-rent component of the value of holding oﬃce.
62See Alesina and Tabellini (2007) for a recent example and Persson and Tabellini (2000) for a textbook treatment
of this type of models.



































An examination of these conditions establishes the comparative statics stated in the proposition.
The intuition for these comparative statics is straightforward. As accountability shifts from the
S to the V, the preferences of the latter gain more weight in the re-election decision. It is therefore
natural that the VC moves Type I policies in favor of V. The eﬀect on Type II policies is more
nuanced because these are policies for which the S and the V agree. It is therefore not obvious that
shifting accountability should aﬀect policy decisions. In the context of the model, such an eﬀect is
only present if V are better than S at monitoring the VC. In particular, if S observes the utility of
the V perfectly, and hence, 2
 = 0, then changing the direction of accountability does not make a
diﬀerence. Needless to say, policies that the VC has no control over should not change as a result
of elections.63
Data
Our ﬁrst source of data is a unique survey collected by the authors. We implemented a retrospective
survey of the political reform histories of 217 villages from 1980-2005. Our surveyors gathered all
current and former village leaders and respected persons (e.g., teachers) together and asked them
to collectively recall the history of reforms.64 In general, there was little problem in recalling
and forming a consensus on the dates in which elections and other reforms were introduced since
these were very important events in the lives of villagers. Moreover, in most villages, surveyors
could access administrative records which corroborated villagers’ recalled dates. Similarly, history
of public investments, land expropriation and exemptions from the One Child Policy were easy to
remember for villagers since these were very salient issues.65
The second source of data is the NFS, which has been maintained as a panel of villages and
households since 1987. The survey used a stratiﬁed sampling approach and is supposed to be
broadly nationally representative for rural areas. For the household surveys, approximately 100
households are randomly selected to be representative at the village level. Over time, villages and
households were added to the sample so that the NFS remained representative. There is little
63While the model can accommodate several alternative results, it is falsiﬁable. In particular, the model is not
consistent with ﬁnding an eﬀect of elections on policies of Type II and no eﬀect on policies of Type I.
64Documentation for these data is available at http://www.econ.yale.edu/~nq3/NANCYS_Yale_Website/Surveys.html.
65Our information regarding the implementation of the One Child Policy was collected with special care. Since not
enforcing an upper-government policy is illegal, we carefully worded our question such that the respondents would
not feel wary and answer truthfully. We asked whether all parents in a village in a given year were allowed to have a
second child if the ﬁrst was a girl.
37attrition according to the Ministry of Agriculture.66
Income and Consumption Results
In our context, the eﬀect of elections on income is ambiguous. On the one hand, the increase in
household land allocation and better provision of public goods can translate into higher income.
On the other hand, the reduction in village government controlled land, which is often leased to
factories, may decrease villagers’ income from enterprises. This is typically earned as wages for
villagers who work for the enterprises or as dividends since, in principle, villagers own equal shares
of all village assets, including enterprises (Che and Qian, 1998). Since one may suspect that villagers
beneﬁt diﬀerentially from village enterprises based on their income and education level – e.g., richer
households beneﬁt more either because they are able to contribute more in the production of the
enterprises or because they are better able to capture the proﬁts – we examine the eﬀect of elections
on income for the entire within-village income distribution.
Appendix Table A4 rows (1)-(6) show the estimates from our baseline equation for the eﬀect
of elections on log total household gross income by income quantile. The estimates are negative in
sign for households above the bottom quartile in income and increasing in magnitude (in terms of
absolute value) for richer households. However, they are not statistically signiﬁcant. The estimates
in rows (7)-(12) suggest that elections reduce income from enterprises for the richest households.
But these estimates are not statistically signiﬁcant. Rows (13)-(18) show that elections reduce wage
income for richer households. However, they are also statistically insigniﬁcant for the most part.67
The results presented here are not conclusive, due to lack of precision. But the patterns of the
coeﬃcients are consistent with our ﬁnding that elections shift land from being leased to factories to
being farmed by households.
66For a detailed description of the NFS, please see http://www.econ.yale.edu/~nq3/NANCYS_Yale_Website/Research.html
67Note that we can only examine enterprise and wage incomes for households in the upper income percentiles
because poor households in our sample do not earn income from these sources.
To address the possibility that elections cause rich households to fear expropriation and thereby to under-report
their incomes, we repeat the estimation with total household consumption as the dependent variable. Rows (19)-
(24) show that we ﬁnd a similar pattern for consumption across income quantiles. The magnitudes of the estimates
are very similar to those for the reduction in total household income. However, the estimates are not statistically
signiﬁcant. We interpret these results as suggestive evidence that our income data does not suﬀer from systematic
under-reporting by the rich after elections were introduced.
38Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
                      
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.     Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev. 
A. Full Sample of Village          B. Subsample of Villages with Household Data       
# of HH in Village  3291  419.769  279.765    # of HH in Village  1121  449.771  279.265 
Fraction of the Largest Kinship Clans  4992  0.523  0.238    Median HH Gross Income (RMB)  1297  11391.210  10519.790 
Jiapu (Family Tree)  5208  0.097  0.296    Median HH Gross Income Growth   1133  0.095  0.226 
Citang (Ancetral Hall)  5208  0.034  0.181    Median HH Income/90th Percentile HH Income  1297  0.512  0.130 
Near City  5208  0.088  0.284    10th Percentile HH Income/Median HH Income  1297  0.503  0.125 
Land was Expropriated by Upper Government  5208  0.036  0.187    Median HH Arable Farm Land (Mu)  1297  5.224  6.054 
Allow a 2nd Child if the 1st is a Girl  5208  0.501  0.500    Median HH Land/90th Percentile Land (Mu)  1264  0.573  0.142 
Village Investment into Public Goods (10,000 RMB)  5208  9.180  89.776    10th Percentile HH Land/50th Percentile HH Land (Mu)  1235  0.356  0.238 
for Schools  5208  1.330  15.596    Median HH Payment of Village and County Fees and Levies  (100 RMB)  1297  3.197  3.081 
for Roads and Sanitation  5208  2.645  58.234           
for Electricity  5208  0.615  7.174    C. Government       
for Irrigation  5208  1.706  36.543    The Number of Village Committee Members   2287  4.365  2.360 
for Planting Trees  5208  0.189  6.050    The Number of Village Party Cadres  2295  6.698  3.815 
for Other  5208  1.791  44.092    Village Chief Tenure  5208  6.688  6.238 
Public Investment funded by Villagers  5208  6.270  92.484    Party Secretary Tenure  5208  10.032  8.126 
Public Investment funded by Upper Levels of 
Government  5208  3.029  55.973           
Total Village Land (Mu)  3291  9,130.517  14,831.330    D. Elections       
Total Village Arable Land (Mu)  3291  2,273.782  2,309.547    1st Election in Village  5208  1988.512  5.240 
Arable HH Farm Land (Mu)  3291  2,196.106  2,291.943    1st Competitive Election (e.g., >1 candidate per position)  5112  1991.873  6.426 
As a fraction of total arable land  3291  0.959  0.152    1st Election with Open Nomination of Candidates  3336  1997.446  5.256 
Arable Collective Land (Mu)  3291  33.799  233.408    Years between 1st Election in Village and Province Implementation  5208  4.963  5.062 
As a fraction of total arable land  3291  0.016  0.095    Years between 1st Election in County and Province Implementation  4416  5.299  5.010 
Arable Land Leased to Village Enterprises (Mu)  3291  25.453  251.757    Years between 1st Election in Village and County Implementation*  4416  -0.141  3.962 
As a fraction of total arable land  3291  0.010  0.074    Anonymous Voting  1281  0.848  0.359 
Median HH Gross Income (RMB)  3778  10512.980  8365.713    Proxy Voting   1265  0.721  0.449 
Median HH Annual Gross Income Growth   3165  0.092  0.218    Roving Ballot Box  1251  0.652  0.476 
Median HH Income/90th Percentile HH Income  3778  0.529  0.123    There were more than 2 Candidates per Position  1293  0.791  0.407 
10th Percentile HH Income/Median HH Income  3778  0.509  0.124     Years between Elections  1084  3.162  1.024 
Notes: Observations are at the village-year level. *The first election in the county excludes the respondent village. Table 2: The Distribution of Leader Powers 
        
Signature Rights  Mean  Std. Dev. 
     
Appoint managers of village enterprises:     
Village Chief  0.323  0.468 
Party Secretary  0.307  0.461 
Village Chief & Party Secretary  0.368  0.482 
     
Employ village government public employees:     
Village Chief  0.266  0.442 
Party Secretary  0.294  0.456 
Village Chief & Party Secretary  0.439  0.496 
     
Reimbursement:     
Village Chief  0.558  0.497 
Party Secretary  0.248  0.432 
Village Chief & Party Secretary  0.193  0.395 
     
Reallocate Land:     
Village Chief  0.329  0.470 
Party Secretary  0.135  0.341 
Village Chief & Party Secretary  0.530  0.499 
     
Large Public Investment:     
Village Chief  0.177  0.382 
Party Secretary  0.150  0.357 
Village Chief & Party Secretary  0.673  0.469 
Notes: Observations are at the village-year level. 
 
Table 3: Elections and Leader Powers 
                                            
    Dependent Variables: De Facto Powers of Village Leaders 
        Post 1st Election    
Post 1st 
Competitive 
Election   
Post 1st Open 
Nomination       
            Coeff  Std Err     Coeff  Std Err     Coeff  Std Err     Obs  R
2 
                             
(1)  Appoint TVE Manager    0.065  (0.039)    -0.028  (0.035)    -0.033  (0.042)    3,336  0.801 
(2)  Employ Village Staff    0.047  (0.038)    -0.021  (0.037)    -0.018  (0.038)    4,103  0.785 
(3)  Reimbursement    0.051  (0.038)    -0.024  (0.034)    -0.053  (0.040)    4,910  0.771 




(5)  Public Investment    0.073  (0.027)    -0.049  (0.025)    0.010  (0.034)    4,457  0.780 
                             
(6)  Appoint TVE Manager    0.001  (0.039)    -0.0002  (0.039)    0.023  (0.044)    3,336  0.797 
(7)  Employ Village Staff    -0.025  (0.041)    0.034  (0.042)    0.048  (0.044)    4,103  0.769 
(8)  Reimbursement    0.014  (0.030)    0.001  (0.030)    0.062  (0.038)    4,910  0.724 




(10)  Public Investment    -0.024  (0.031)    -0.005  (0.027)    0.019  (0.038)    4,457  0.808 
                             
(11)  Appoint TVE Manager    -0.067  (0.035)    0.027  (0.031)    0.022  (0.035)    3,336  0.832 
(12)  Employ Village Staff    -0.023  (0.031)    -0.013  (0.030)    -0.030  (0.034)    4,103  0.819 
(13)  Reimbursement    -0.066  (0.027)    0.023  (0.023)    -0.009  (0.032)    4,910  0.810 




(15)  Public Investment     -0.050  (0.029)     0.053  (0.021)     -0.029  (0.030)     4,457  0.775 
Notes: All regressions control for province-time trends, village and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. 
 Table 4: The Effect of Elections on Type I, III Policies  
                 
  Dependent Variables 
  Type I: Unpopular Policies    Type III: Placebo Outcomes 
 
 Dummy for Allowing a 
2nd Child if the 1st is a 
Girl 
Dummy for Upper 
Government 
Expropriation of Village 
Land 
 
Ln Public Investment 
from Special Aid 
Ln Distance to Nearest 
Highschool 
   (1)  (2)     (3)  (4) 
           
Post 1st Election  0.082  -0.018    0.005  -0.012 
  (0.040)  (0.011)    (0.025)  (0.028) 
           
Post 1st Competitive 
Election  0.006  0.010    0.002  -0.028 
  (0.032)  (0.011)    (0.029)  (0.017) 
           
Post 1st Open Nomination  -0.053  -0.007    0.008  -0.029 
  (0.035)  (0.011)    (0.024)  (0.025) 
           
Observations  5,208  5,208    5,208  4,692 
R
2  0.755  0.080     0.079  0.955 
Notes: All regressions control for province-time trends, village fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the village 
level. 
Table 5: The Effect of Elections on Public Goods Investment (Type II) 
                       
  Dependent Variables 












   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
  A. Ln Total Public Investment 
Post 1st Election  0.175  0.0849  0.0045  0.0448  -0.0112  0.0464  0.0488 
  (0.114)  (0.096)  (0.025)  (0.047)  (0.034)  (0.054)  (0.065) 
               
Observations  5,208  5,208  5,208  5,208  5,208  5,208  5,208 
R
2  0.199  0.176  0.079  0.161  0.120  0.157  0.173 
  B. Irrigation 
Post 1st Election  -2.446  -1.599  -0.472  0.330  -0.097  -0.142  -0.238 
  (1.265)  (1.191)  (0.268)  (0.816)  (0.096)  (0.876)  (0.868) 
               
Post 1st Election x Avg Ln HH Farm Land  0.374  0.236  0.067  -0.029  0.011  0.038  0.049 
  (0.165)  (0.160)  (0.037)  (0.113)  (0.009)  (0.122)  (0.121) 
               
Observations  5,208  5,208  5,208  5,208  5,208  5,208  5,208 
R
2  0.106  0.106  0.058  0.109  0.065  0.106  0.106 
  C. Schooling* 
Post 1st Election  -2.898  6.273  -0.509  -2.633  -0.963  -3.142  -4.105 
  (15.550)  (13.470)  (3.660)  (5.109)  (3.257)  (5.528)  (6.021) 
               
Post 1st Election x # Kids 7-13  0.013  0.015  0.000  -0.001  0.0002  -0.002  -0.001 
  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
               
Observations  5,064  5,064  5,064  5,064  5,064  5,064  5,064 
R
2  0.077  0.069  0.057  0.108  0.062  0.099  0.086 
Notes: *The coefficients for the estimates on public investment in schooling are scaled by 1,000 for ease of interpretation. 
 All regressions control for post first competitive election, post first open nomination, province-time trends, village and year fixed effects. 
The regressions in Panels B and C also control for the interaction of the relevant village characteristic (e.g., number of kids age 7-13, ln 
total household farm land) with post first competitive election and post first open nominations. Standard errors are clustered at the 
village level. Table 6: The Effect of Elections on Household Land Allocation (Type II) 
                                      
  Dependent Variables: Village Land Distribution 
  Quantile of Within-village Household Land Distribution   
Land Managed by the 
Village Government 














   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)     (10)  (11) 
Post 1st Election  0.00608  0.248  0.257  0.280  0.253  0.203  0.162  0.113  0.0969    -0.679  -0.718 
  (0.222)  (0.203)  (0.172)  (0.150)  (0.117)  (0.113)  (0.109)  (0.103)  (0.105)    (0.388)  (0.405) 
                         
Post 1st Competitive Election  0.0537  -0.262  -0.101  -0.0478  -0.0188  0.00816  0.0245  0.0503  0.0600    -0.103  0.178 
  (0.195)  (0.183)  (0.138)  (0.128)  (0.0924)  (0.0843)  (0.0857)  (0.0923)  (0.0996)    (0.455)  (0.422) 
                         
Post 1st Open Nomination  -0.102  -0.144  -0.263  -0.128  -0.106  -0.0834  -0.0385  0.0318  0.101    0.387  -0.102 
  (0.182)  (0.147)  (0.153)  (0.122)  (0.103)  (0.106)  (0.0929)  (0.0812)  (0.0821)    (0.388)  (0.372) 
                         
Observations  1297  1297  1297  1297  1297  1297  1297  1297  1297    315  501 
R-squared  0.735  0.792  0.808  0.857  0.884  0.890  0.888  0.882  0.881     0.927  0.845 
Notes: All regressions control for province-time trends, village and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Regressions in columns 
(1)-(9) use the household data subsample. Regressions in columns (10) -(11) use subsamples of villages from the full 217 village sample. Column (10) includes 
villages-years that lease some land to firms. Column (11) includes village-years that have some land managed by the collectives. 
  
Table 7: The 2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Elections – Robustness to Within-County Heterogeneity 
                                               
  Dependent Variables 







  Land Expropriation 
Dummy   
Dummy for Allowing 
a 2nd Child if the 
1st is a Girl 
  Ln Public Investment in 
Irrigation from Villagers    Ln Public Investment in 
Schooling from Villagers 
  1st Stage (1 
Instrument)  
1st Stage (2 
Instruments) 
1st Stage (2 













































   (1)  (2)  (3)     (4)  (5)     (6)  (7)     (8)  (9)     (10)  (11) 
                               
Post 1st Election in County  0.288  0.287  0.006                         
  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.030)                         
                               
Post 1st Open Nomination 
in County    0.016  0.176                         
    (0.025)  (0.041)                         
                               
Post 1st Election          -0.053  -0.057    0.294  0.303    19.470  16.190    -1.753  -2.052 
          (0.029)  (0.031)    (0.111)  (0.119)    (40.180)  (38.660)    (1.824)  (2.206) 
                               
Post 1st Open Nomination  -0.021        -0.007  0.019    -0.052  -0.111    -10.740  15.000    -0.039  2.304 
  (0.022)        (0.011)  (0.063)    (0.035)  (0.184)    (26.070)  (107.900)    (0.832)  (3.047) 
                               
Post 1st Competitive 
Election  0.476  0.473  0.129    0.029  0.028    -0.109  -0.105    -14.430  -15.760    1.551  1.361 
  (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.029)    (0.018)  (0.019)    (0.063)  (0.063)    (26.370)  (25.890)    (1.928)  (1.943) 
                               
Post st Election x                       0.014  0.014       
Avg # of Kids 7-13 in Village                      (0.005)  (0.005)       
                               
Post 1st Election x                             0.285  0.315 
Avg Ln HH Arable Land                            (0.240)  (0.276) 
                               
Observations  5,208  5,208  5,208     5,208  5,208     5,208  5,208     5,064  5,064     5,208  5,208 
Notes: All regressions control for province-time trends, village and year fixed effects. The regressions in columns (8)-(11) also control for the interaction of the relevant village characteristic (e.g., 
number of kids age 7-13, log total household farmland) with post first competitive election and post first open nominations. The interaction terms are instrumented by the interaction of the 
introduction of elections and open nominations in the county and the same relevant characteristics. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. 
  Table 8: The Effect of Elections – Robustness to Omitted Factors 
                                               





































































   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15) 
  A. Dependent Variable: Ln Median HH Land 
Post 1st Election  0.253  0.207  0.240  0.253  0.260  0.224  0.253  0.253  0.286  0.276  0.257  0.304  0.252  0.254  0.220 
  (0.117)  (0.129)  (0.114)  (0.117)  (0.116)  (0.105)  (0.117)  (0.117)  (0.112)  (0.120)  (0.115)  (0.102)  (0.114)  (0.119)  (0.105) 
                               
Obs  1,297  1,297  1,297  1,297  1,297  1,297  1,297  1,297  1,297  1,297  1,297  1,297  1,297  1,297  1,297 
R
2  0.884  0.904  0.896  0.884  0.888  0.898  0.884  0.884  0.883  0.888  0.885  0.900  0.891  0.885  0.928 
  B. Dependent Variable: Ln Median HH Fees and Levies 
Post 1st Election  0.956  0.810  0.879  0.956  0.980  0.938  0.956  0.956  0.989  0.990  0.931  0.860  0.890  0.957  0.693 
  (0.503)  (0.514)  (0.505)  (0.503)  (0.507)  (0.496)  (0.503)  (0.503)  (0.539)  (0.507)  (0.510)  (0.516)  (0.511)  (0.510)  (0.514) 
                               
Obs  1,297  1,297  1,297  1,297  1,297  1,297  1,297  1,297  1,297  1,297  1,297  1,297  1,297  1,297  1,297 
R
2  0.610  0.616  0.617  0.610  0.616  0.615  0.610  0.610  0.619  0.616  0.618  0.614  0.616  0.613  0.664 
  C. Dependent Variable: Upper Government Land Expropriation 
Post 1st Election  -0.018  -0.044  -0.041  -0.018  -0.017  -0.018  -0.050  -0.018  -0.016  -0.017  -0.018  -0.017  -0.017  -0.018  -0.014 
  (0.011)  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.022)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.010) 
                               
Obs  5,208  1,752  1,752  5,208  5,208  5,208  1,297  5,208  5,064  5,208  5,208  5,208  5,208  5,208  5,208 
R
2  0.080  0.094  0.091  0.080  0.082  0.087  0.101  0.080  0.087  0.083  0.083  0.083  0.085  0.082  0.125 
  D. Dependent Variable: Dummy for Allowing a 2nd Child if the 1st is a Girl 
Post 1st Election  0.082  0.174  0.196  0.082  0.086  0.082  0.178  0.082  0.072  0.084  0.086  0.081  0.083  0.083  0.097 
  (0.040)  (0.077)  (0.078)  (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.099)  (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.039)  (0.040)  (0.039)  (0.040)  (0.040) 
                               
Obs  5,208  1,752  1,752  5,208  5,208  5,208  1,297  5,208  5,064  5,208  5,208  5,208  5,208  5,208  5,208 
R
2  0.755  0.739  0.737  0.755  0.756  0.755  0.758  0.755  0.757  0.757  0.762  0.755  0.757  0.756  0.771 
  E. Dependent Variable: Ln Total Public Investment 
Post 1st Election  0.175  0.175  0.164  0.175  0.171  0.178  0.303  0.175  0.143  0.171  0.176  0.180  0.182  0.181  0.206 
  (0.114)  (0.225)  (0.220)  (0.114)  (0.114)  (0.114)  (0.293)  (0.114)  (0.113)  (0.115)  (0.114)  (0.115)  (0.115)  (0.114)  (0.112) 
                               
Obs  5,208  1,752  1,752  5,208  5,208  5,208  1,297  5,208  5,064  5,208  5,208  5,208  5,208  5,208  5,208 
R
2  0.199  0.202  0.202  0.199  0.201  0.205  0.197  0.199  0.204  0.201  0.206  0.204  0.202  0.201  0.231 
  F. Dependent Variable: Ln Public Investment in Irrigation from Village Funds 
Post 1st Election x Avg 
Ln HH Farmland  0.237      0.236  0.238  0.217  0.227    0.226  0.239  0.231  0.238  0.225  0.232  0.215 
  (0.160)      (0.160)  (0.161)  (0.156)  (0.164)    (0.160)  (0.156)  (0.159)  (0.162)  (0.161)  (0.161)  (0.159) 
                               
Obs  5,208      5,208  5,208  5,208  5,208    5,064  5,208  5,208  5,208  5,208  5,208  5,208 
R
2  0.102        0.106  0.110  0.110  0.114     0.109  0.108  0.108  0.111  0.109  0.107  0.137 
  G. Dependent Variable: Ln Public Investment in Schools from Village Funds** 
Post 1st Election x # of 
Kids 7-13  0.015      0.015  0.015  0.014  0.016    0.015  0.016  0.015  0.015  0.015  0.022  0.013 
  (0.006)      (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)    (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.005) 
                               
Obs  5,064      5,064  5,064  5,064  5,064    5,064  5,064  5,064  5,064  5,064  3,001  5,064 
R
2  0.069        0.069  0.072  0.076  0.072     0.074  0.071  0.072  0.077  0.073  0.107  0.098 
Notes: All regressions control for province-time trends, village and year fixed effects. The regressions in Panels F and G also control for the interaction of the relevant village characteristic (e.g., number of kids age 7-13, log total 
household farmland) with post first competitive election and post first open nominations. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. *For outcomes in Panels C-G, we do not control for the starred (*) land and household fee 
controls in column (15). **The coefficients for the estimates on public investment in schooling are scaled by 1,000 for ease of interpretation. Panels A and B uses data from the 72-subsample. Panels C-G use the full sample of 
217 villages. 
 Table 9: The Effect of Elections – Robustness to Additional Factors 
                       
  Dependent Variables 





















  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
   A. Ln Median HH Land 
Post 1st Election  0.253  0.318  0.257  0.252  0.249  0.271  0.304 
  (0.117)  (0.150)  (0.118)  (0.116)  (0.115)  (0.119)  (0.141) 
               
Observations  1,297  1,297  1,297  1,297  1,297  1,297  1,297 
R
2  0.884  0.889  0.885  0.889  0.887  0.886  0.897 
  B. Ln Median HH Fees and Levies 
Post 1st Election  0.956  0.875  0.962  1.015  0.969  0.910  0.991 
  (0.503)  (0.529)  (0.508)  (0.515)  (0.506)  (0.524)  (0.575) 
               
Observations  1,297  1,297  1,297  1,297  1,297  1,297  1,297 
R
2  0.610  0.614  0.614  0.622  0.613  0.615  0.638 
  C. Upper Government Land Expropriation 
Post 1st Election  -0.018  -0.019  -0.017  -0.016  -0.018  -0.017  -0.016 
  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.013) 
               
Observations  5,208  5,208  5,208  5,208  5,208  5,208  5,208 
R
2  0.08  0.081  0.084  0.09  0.08  0.084  0.099 
  D. Dummy for Allowing a 2nd Child if the 1st is a Girl 
Post 1st Election  0.082  0.077  0.087  0.083  0.082  0.090  0.087 
  (0.040)  (0.042)  (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.042) 
               
Observations  5,208  5,208  5,208  5,208  5,208  5,208  5,208 
R
2  0.755  0.755  0.756  0.756  0.755  0.758  0.761 
  E. Ln Total Public Investment 
Post 1st Election  0.175  0.189  0.173  0.178  0.175  0.174  0.198 
  (0.114)  (0.127)  (0.116)  (0.115)  (0.114)  (0.115)  (0.131) 
               
Observations  5,208  5,208  5,208  5,208  5,208  5,208  5,208 
R
2  0.199  0.199  0.202  0.208  0.199  0.202  0.214 
  F. Ln Public Investment into Irrigation (from Village Funds) 
Post 1st Election x   0.236  0.246  0.235  0.260  0.240  0.239  0.275 
Avg Ln HH Farmland  (0.160)  (0.164)  (0.160)  (0.163)  (0.159)  (0.160)  (0.168) 
               
Observations  5,208  5,208  5,208  5,208  5,208  5,208  5,208 
R
2  0.106  0.106  0.109  0.113  0.106  0.109  0.12 
  G. Ln Public Investment into Schooling (from Village Funds)* 
Post 1st Election x  0.015  0.015  0.015  0.015  0.016  0.015  0.014 
 # of Kids 7-13  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
               
Observations  5,064  5,064  5,064  5,064  5,064  5,064  5,064 
R
2  0.069  0.07  0.073  0.083  0.069  0.072  0.09 
Notes: *The coefficients for the estimates on public investment in schooling are scaled by 1,000 for ease of interpretation.  
All regressions control for province-time trends, village and year fixed effects. The regressions in Panels F and G also control 
for the interaction of the relevant village characteristic (e.g., number of kids age 7-13, log total household farm land) with post 
first competitive election and post first open nominations. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. . Panels A and B 
use data from the 72 subsample. Panels C-G use the full sample of 217 villages. 
 Table 10: The Effect of Elections – Robustness to the Omission of Villages that Introduced Elections Before 1987 
                                   
  Dependent Variables 
  Baseline 
Sample 
Omit if 1st 
Election 
<1987 
  Baseline 
Sample 
Omit if 1st 
Election 
<1987 
  Baseline 
Sample 
Omit if 1st 
Election 
<1987 
  Baseline 
Sample 
Omit if 1st 
Election 
<1987 
  (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)    (5)  (6)    (7)  (8) 
   Panel A. 
  Ln Median HH Land    Ln Median HH Fees    Upper Government Land 
Expropriation   
Dummy for Allowing a 
2nd Child if the 1st is a 
Girl 
                       
Post 1st Election  0.253  0.302    0.956  0.982    -0.018  -0.023    0.082  0.082 
  (0.117)  (0.134)    (0.503)  (0.556)    (0.011)  (0.016)    (0.040)  (0.046) 
                       
Observations  1,297  1,152    1,297  1,152    5,208  3,906    5,208  3,906 
R
2  0.884  0.896    0.610  0.625    0.080  0.089    0.755  0.820 
  Panel B 
  Ln Total Public 
Investment     Ln Public Investment in 
Schooling from Villagers     Ln Public Investment in 
Irrigation from Villagers       
  Baseline 
Sample 
Omit if 1st 
Election 
<1987 
   Baseline 
Sample 
Omit if 1st 
Election 
<1987 
   Baseline 
Sample 
Omit if 1st 
Election 
<1987 
     
                       
Post 1st Election  0.175  0.340    6.273  11.160    -1.599  -1.788       
  (0.114)  (0.172)    (13.470)  (18.640)    (1.191)  (1.855)       
                       
Post 1st Election x # of Kids 7-13        0.015  0.015             
        (0.006)  (0.010)             
                       
Post 1st Election x Avg Ln HH Farmland              0.236  0.286       
              (0.160)  (0.243)       
                       
Observations  5,208  3,906    5,064  3,798    5,208  3,906       
R
2  0.199  0.194     0.069  0.085     0.106  0.126          
Notes: All regressions control for the introduction of the first competitive election and open nominations, province-year trends, village and year fixed effects. Regressions in 
Panel B also control for the interactions of those electoral reforms with the relevant village characteristics (e.g., # of kids 7-13, average log total household far land). The 
standard errors are clustered at the village level. Panel A columns (1)-(4) use data from the 72 village subsample. All other regressions use the full sample of 217 villages.  
Figure 1: The Correlation between the Introduction of Elections and the Power to Unilaterally Appoint 




































































































































































































































































6#3,)*7&'%#*8&,)(*95#%:"'*APPENDIX Table A1: Household and Village Government Balance Sheet 
           
   Obs  Mean  Std. Dev. 
A. Households 
Total Income  1,297  15,658  19,746 
from collectives  1,296  375  814 
from HH management  1,297  10,433  13,176 
from wages  1,297  2,546  3,720 
other  1,297  1,344  3,240 
       
Total Expenditures  1,297  13,324  17,480 
Household management expenditures  1,297  4,777  10,151 
Levies and Fees to county and village governments  1,297  454  530 
Total Consumption  1,297  7,385  8,126 
   food  1,297  3,169  2,344 
        grain food  1,297  1,020  479 
        non-grain food  1,297  1,702  1,655 
   clothes  1,297  432  356 
   house  1,297  1,308  2,383 
   fuel  1,297  238  159 
   living services  1,297  487  622 
   tuition  1,297  655  691 
   other   1,297  742  1,139 
B. Village Governments 
Total Revenues (100 RMB)  4,773  3,564  32,250 
from collectives  4,773  1,802  24,526 
from HH*  4,773  642  8,226 
       
Total Expenditures (100 RMB)  4,773  3,388  34,304 
collective production*  4,773  1,192  27,574 
delivery to upper levels of gov  4,773  296  1,808 
public affairs  4,773  279  1,206 
Administrative Expenditures*  4,773  210  781 
Notes: The data in panel A are obtained from household-level data for 72 villages. The average income and expenditure are 
computed together with their corresponding subcategories for each village and year. In panel B, the data are from the NFS village 
surveys for 217 villages. The time coverage for both panel A and B are 1987-2005 (with the exception of years 1992 and 1994, 
during which the survey was not conducted). *The time coverage of these variables is 1987-2002. Other components of fiscal 
revenues are payments for obligated working days bought off, tax revenue from firm, transfers from upper levels of government 
and miscellaneous revenue. Other components of village expenditure are expenses on household production. We do not report 
summary statistics for these variables because they are not systematically reported until 1993.  
  
Table A2: Reform Timing 
                          
  First Election   
First Competitive Election (with >1 

















Year  (1)  (2)     (3)  (4)     (5)  (6) 
                 
1982  13  5.99    10  4.69    1  0.72 
1983  13  11.98    7  7.98    1  1.44 
1984  42  31.34    29  21.6    7  6.47 
1985  3  32.72    1  22.07    0  6.47 
1986  35  48.85    19  30.99    4  9.35 
1987  12  54.38    6  33.8    1  10.07 
1988  7  57.6    4  35.68    1  10.79 
1989  15  64.52    11  40.85    1  11.51 
1990  25  76.04    17  48.83    1  12.23 
1991  1  76.5    3  50.23    0  12.23 
1992  3  77.88    5  52.58    1  12.95 
1993  6  80.65    6  55.4    3  15.11 
1994  2  81.57    5  57.75    3  17.27 
1995  9  85.71    8  61.5    3  19.42 
1996  4  87.56    13  67.61    18  32.37 
1997  3  88.94    4  69.48    0  32.37 
1998  6  91.71    7  72.77    6  36.69 
1999  9  95.85    37  90.14    42  66.91 
2000  7  99.08    8  93.9    12  75.54 
2001  2  100    6  96.71    12  84.17 
2002  0  100    5  99.06    11  92.09 
2003  0  100    0  99.06    3  94.24 
2004  0  100    2  100    1  94.96 
2005  0  100    0  100    7  100 
                 
Total  217        213        139    
 Table A3: The Effect of Elections on Household Fees 
                             
 
Dependent Variables: Ln Levies and Fees paid to Village, and County (by deciles of the 
within-village Distribution of Household Fees) 
  10th  20th  30th  40th  50th  60th  70th  80th  90th 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
                   
Post 1st Election  1.027  0.797  0.765  0.930  0.956  0.971  1.069  0.922  0.539 
  (0.450)  (0.468)  (0.449)  (0.473)  (0.503)  (0.506)  (0.522)  (0.480)  (0.401) 
                   
Post 1st Competitive Election  -0.062  -0.269  -0.085  -0.080  -0.109  -0.102  -0.268  -0.390  -0.452 
  (0.381)  (0.381)  (0.342)  (0.354)  (0.344)  (0.355)  (0.363)  (0.369)  (0.367) 
                   
Post 1st Open Nomination  0.103  -0.131  -0.064  0.086  0.234  0.140  0.109  0.079  0.011 
  (0.389)  (0.384)  (0.416)  (0.373)  (0.362)  (0.376)  (0.381)  (0.397)  (0.400) 
                   
Observations  1,297  1,297  1,297  1,297  1,297  1,297  1,297  1,297  1,297 
R-squared  0.556  0.572  0.596  0.586  0.61  0.607  0.611  0.618  0.586 
Notes: All regressions control for province-time trends, village and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the 
village level. These regressions use the 72-village subsample. 
 
Table A4: The Effect of Elections on Household Income by Source 
                          
  Dependent Variables    Post 1st Election       
            Coeff  SE     Obs  R
2 
                 
(1)  p10    0.028  (0.130)    1,297  0.496 
(2)  p25    -0.021  (0.051)    1,297  0.876 
(3)  p50    -0.055  (0.043)    1,297  0.903 
(4)  p75    -0.082  (0.051)    1,297  0.901 
(5)  p90    -0.096  (0.068)    1,297  0.884 
(6) 
Ln Total HH 
Gross 
Income 
Mean    -0.077  (0.060)    1,297  0.893 
                 
(7)  p10             
(8)  p25             
(9)  p50    0.015  (0.024)    870  0.107 
(10)  p75    -0.292  (0.341)    870  0.257 






Mean    -1.208  (1.003)    868  0.460 
                 
(13)  p10    0.146  (0.134)    1,297  0.185 
(14)  p25    0.496  (0.562)    1,297  0.473 
(15)  p50    -0.920  (0.653)    1,297  0.556 
(16)  p75    -1.718  (0.622)    1,297  0.549 





Mean    -0.377  (0.151)    1,297  0.736 
                 
(19)  p10    0.030  (0.126)    1,297  0.527 
(20)  p25    -0.025  (0.058)    1,297  0.890 
(21)  p50    -0.050  (0.054)    1,297  0.904 
(22)  p75    -0.081  (0.057)    1,297  0.899 
(23)  p90    -0.106  (0.070)    1,297  0.864 
(24) 
Ln Total HH 
Consumption 
Mean     -0.086  (0.063)     1,297  0.895 
Notes: All regressions control for province-time trends, village and year fixed effects. Standard 
errors are clustered at the village level.  These regressions use the 72-village subsample. 
 Table A5: Correlation between the Years since the Introduction of Elections and Outcomes 
                                            
  Dependent Variables 









Staff  Reimburse  Land Re-
allocation 
Public 





Staff  Reimburse  Land Re-
allocation 
Public 






   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)     (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)     (16)  (17) 
                             
Dummy -3  0.008  0.027  0.013  0.018  -0.004    0.022  -0.004  0.012  0.025  0.016    0.0003   
  (0.017)  (0.019)  (0.016)  (0.018)  (0.013)    (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.016)    (0.029)   
Dummy -2  0.009  0.031  0.021  0.032  0.008    0.020  -0.009  0.005  0.019  0.014    -0.021   
  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.012)    (0.023)  (0.021)  (0.016)  (0.018)  (0.018)    (0.029)   
Dummy -1  0.013  0.037  0.029  0.043  0.011    0.021  0.000  -0.005  0.021  0.017    -0.008  0.032 
  (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.021)  (0.018)  (0.012)    (0.023)  (0.021)  (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.018)    (0.030)  (0.065) 
Dummy 0  0.040  0.032  0.049  0.050  0.037    -0.014  0.002  -0.038  -0.031  -0.036    -0.016  0.008 
  (0.024)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.018)  (0.014)    (0.025)  (0.022)  (0.016)  (0.018)  (0.018)    (0.031)  (0.054) 
Dummy +1  0.054  0.036  0.051  0.061  0.041    -0.025  0.001  -0.030  -0.023  -0.025    0.015  0.041 
  (0.024)  (0.020)  (0.021)  (0.019)  (0.016)    (0.027)  (0.023)  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.017)    (0.031)  (0.055) 
Dummy +2  0.053  0.045  0.049  0.080  0.050    -0.016  0.000  -0.025  -0.021  -0.021    0.028  0.032 
  (0.024)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.017)    (0.027)  (0.022)  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.017)    (0.029)  (0.054) 
Dummy +3  0.048  0.037  0.054  0.058  0.043    -0.018  0.003  -0.028  -0.018  -0.011    0.019  0.057 
  (0.023)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.017)    (0.024)  (0.020)  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.016)    (0.029)  (0.056) 
Dummy +4  0.036  0.029  0.041  0.052  0.036    -0.032  -0.005  -0.033  -0.022  -0.015    0.038  0.118 
  (0.022)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.018)  (0.017)    (0.022)  (0.019)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)    (0.027)  (0.052) 
Dummy +5  0.036  0.030  0.044  0.038  0.021    -0.027  -0.006  -0.034  -0.017  -0.008    0.028  0.117 
  (0.023)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.018)  (0.016)    (0.020)  (0.018)  (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.017)    (0.023)  (0.062) 
                             
Observations  3,336  4,103  4,910  3,936  4,457    3,336  4,103  4,910  3,936  4,457    5,208  1,297 
R
2  0.802  0.785  0.772  0.801  0.780     0.832  0.819  0.809  0.798  0.775     0.754  0.883 
Notes: All regressions control for post first competitive election, post first open nomination, province-time trends, village and year fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered at the village level. Columns (1)-(16) use data from the full 217 sample of villages. Column (17) uses data from the 72-village subsample. 